Breaking through Minefields in the Sri Lankan Civil War

The Sri Lankan Civil War has been raging for decades with tens of thousands of people killed on each side. Ethnic Tamil separatists have been fighting for a racially exclusive country in the North and East of the island. Developments since 2004 have seen the Liberation Ligers of Tamil Eelam, or LTTE lose almost all of their territory in the East of the island, while minor losses have been suffered on the Western coast as well. Splits within the rebel organization and a modernized Sri Lankan military has pushed the LTTE to the brink of destruction and what could be the final stage of the war is on the horizon. The remaining LTTE forces have been surrounded in the Northern part of Sri Lanka, called the Wanni. This region includes the rebellion's capital city of Kilinochchi and is defended on several fronts by long lines of trenches, bunkers, and minefields. Commander of the Sri Lankan Army, Lt. General Sarath Fonseka, has sworn to take control of the Wanni by the end of 2008, and fierce trench warfare has resulted in tremendous losses on both sides.

The total collapse of most of the LTTE controlled territory in the past few years has allowed Sri Lanka the opportunity to end this long war once and for all.

However, Sri Lankan Military advances have stalled on all fronts in the Wanni. While minor advances continue on the Mannar, Weli Oya, Vavuniya, and Jaffna fronts, these advances are measured in yards. Initially, general Fonseka did not want to capture territory. His objective was to kill as many LTTE fighters as possible to degrade their military force ahead of a major offensive in the months between rainy seasons. With over a month of good weather already lost since the Northern Offensive began, there has been a disappointing lack of progress into LTTE territory. This can be attributed to four key factors:

• The No-man's Land between Sri Lankan and LTTE trenches have been heavily mined, as have areas within LTTE defenses.
• Public Opinion holds back a major offensive because many people fear the heavier upfront casualties that such an offensive would entail.
  
• General Fonseka is acting too conservatively for various military reasons.
  
• Economic considerations limit Sri Lanka's capacity to wage war.

In this first of another two part series, the question of clearing the minefields that are largely responsible for the stalled Sri Lankan advance will be addressed

The large number of anti-personnel mines and a fewer number of anti-tank mines are a serious threat that impedes Sri Lankan advances. Several solutions exist to combat the minefields, each with different strengths and weaknesses. Defining and implementing a strategy to break through these minefields and any future minefields with relative speed and effectiveness should be one of the highest priorities of the military, if not the highest. Four main possible solutions, each with with unique benefits and drawbacks, will be discussed here.

The Sri Lankan military has used this low-tech method of eliminating mines for decades.

The first option is the oldest solution to land mines in existence. Often referred to as the "Poke and Pray" method, this is the simple act of having an individual walk into an area thought to be mined and start poking the ground with a knife or stick. When they hit something metallic or hollow, they carefully dig it up and dispose of it, all the while praying that the mine doesn't explode in their face. This method is very slow and would take too long to be a viable option for clearing a path into the Wanni. The use of hand held metal detectors is a derivative of this method.

A flail system was the first effective method of quickly clearing a safe path through a minefield.

A second option is to used a modified bulldozer equipped with swinging chain flails in place of the standard blade to "rake" the minefield. This method is much faster than the previous solution and workers are protected from the dangers of anti-personnel mines. It does suffer from two big setbacks though.

Terrain can greatly limit where a bulldozer can go. The thick jungles of the Wanni and any rocky terrain can limit the bulldozer's effectiveness and even prevent access all together. This allows the LTTE to know well in advance where this system can punch a hole for a military advance, and they have had a long time to prepare strong defenses in these bottlenecks. An ideal solution would allow the military to break through the minefield at a greater number of locations, preventing the LTTE from catching soldiers in a vulnerable bottleneck. The whole of the Jaffna Front is testament to this problem.

The other issue is the bulldozer's vulnerability to enemy fire. These slow lumbering targets are easy to hit with RPGs, mortars, rockets, and even artillery. While escorts can and must be assigned to each bulldozer, by the nature of their task, they must be exposed to enemy fire more than any other unit. This gives bulldozer units a high casualty probability and these prospects make this an undesirable solution, though they will probably be used anyway, where possible, due to necessity.

A third option that has been considered in the past but has proven to not be very reliable is the bombardment solution. The general idea is to saturate a minefield with artillery, mortar, rocket, and even cluster bomb air strikes to blast a hole through the mines. Despite it being the safest, since no one has to actually enter the minefield or brave hostile fire, four issues make this solution a dead end.

First, the imperfect nature of carpet bombing means that there is no way to be sure that a path is clear. Next, unexploded munitions add risk to soldiers on the march, replacing many of the mines that would have been destroyed. The last purely military problem is that the hours or days of bombardment would be a pretty obvious giveaway that the SLA plans to move through this particular chunk of real estate. This gives the LTTE plenty of time to prepare for Sri Lankan advances. On an economic note, the price for the munitions needed for such an attempt would be beyond Sri Lanka's economic capacity, assuming they plan to fight the rest of the war after breaking through. Given that their ability to pay for the Northern offensive is already in doubt, this kind of spending is a get out of jail free card for the Tigers.

Using a chain of explosives to clear a path through a minefield has proven to be very effective in recent conflicts, including the Gulf War and Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Another solution that has possibly the greatest potential for success is the use of explosive chains fired into a minefield to blast a hole path for soldiers to exploit. This method is used by most well to do military organizations, such as the Chinese and the NATO states. Gaps varying in size from enough for a single file line of infantry to wide gaps for tank columns can be made depending on the power of the explosives and can clear a path hundreds of yards long. These explosives use shock waves to detonate the mines as if they had been stepped on, and as a result of using shock waves that pass through the air and ground, the trees and stones that might limit a bulldozer are no longer sufficient protection for the mines. By firing a chain of explosives from a certain distance, the mine clearing units are more protected from enemy fire than a bulldozer would be, while the unit is never at risk from the mines they are seeking to clear. The effectiveness and superior safety of this design make this the preferable solution on a purely military level. The only serious drawback is the cost, not only in building the contraptions but in munitions that bulldozers don't spend. Looking at cost in this way, though, is not the right way to go about assessing value. These costs must be compared, not just to the cost of modifying a bulldozer, but also to the price of replacing destroyed bulldozers and the cost in lives that more dangerous methods entail, as well as the cost in tactical military capabilities, since a bulldozer is limited in where it can advance, giving the LTTE clear indications of SLA routes of advance.

The basic conclusion is that bulldozers should be used in cleared areas where mines remain, and in areas where explosive chain units are not available, but that these explosive chains should be used as extensively as possible on the front lines.

Now an odd reaction seen from many Sri Lankans when it comes to military hardware is "who can we buy these from" and this is another example of this. It then opens up the debate on how Sri Lanka can afford to buy such units and this has become the killing stroke for many ideas for military reforms. This is a bizarre reaction. This is a dangerous mindset that should be discouraged. The LTTE are masters of innovation and the Sri Lankan military should seek to emulate them in this regard. Explosive chains are just packages of explosive material, chained together, thus the name. The rest of this engineering marvel is building an industrial grade blowgun with "bomb on a rope" tied to the end. If the blowgun method proves to be too problematic, the SLA could always just remove the warhead from a mid-range rocket from one of the MBRLs and use it. They might even use the MBRL itself and not even have to build a separate unit for mine clearing. Regardless, this is not science only attainable by world superpowers.

This is just one example of Sri Lanka's bad habit of seeking to buy what they can make, but that's a story for another time.

The Darfur Conflict, Part Two: The Plan for Military Action in Darfur

Few people seem to realize what would be required for any peacekeeping operation in Darfur to be successful. Clearly the small peacekeeping missions of the African Union and the United Nations have never seen success in Africa. From Somalia, to the Democratic Republic of Congo, to Darfur, to Rwanda, small efforts yield even smaller results. If the genocide is to truly be stopped, and if the war is truly to be ended, then a military force will be needed on the scale of World War Two's Russian Front.

A large military force entering the region to stop all warring parties from fighting their enemies will result in all of these armed groups seeing the peacekeeping force as an invading army sticking its nose where it doesn’t belong. This large number of hostile combatants will require a huge military force to overcome, while the campaign, especially if Western nations are involved, will probably result in foreign terrorist groups entering the country, further increasing the number of hostile fighters arrayed against it. To really understand what this entails, two factors must be understood: the size of the conflict zone and the different groups that will be enemies of the Darfur Peacekeeping Force, or DPKF.

As you can see, the conflict has spread to three separate nations. (Courtesy of the BBC)

Darfur is a region that borders, or is arguably a part of, four different countries, of which at least three have seen significant violence. Assuming Libya has kept and can continue to keep the peace on the small border it has with Darfur, the nations of Sudan, Chad, and the Central African Republic all contain part of a very large and continually expanding combat zone. Since any massive military operation by foreign powers within their borders would be seen by all three nations as acts of war, if the DPKF were to be created and deployed, they would be campaigning in the entire area of all three countries. This is because they would have to not only neutralize a plethora of militant and terrorist groups, but would also have to bring the governments and military forces of all three nations to heel. This assumes that no belligerent forces base themselves from within additional nations like Uganda or Ethiopia, which is a very real possibility. Under this assumption, the minimum size of the area the DPKF would be keeping the peace in would be roughly half the size of the entire United States.

To give an idea of the force needed to take control of such a large area, the Iraq War proves to be an easy example. Iraq is roughly the size of California. 160,000 American military personnel, roughly 400,000 Iraqi soldiers and police, 70,000 Sons of Iraq, and somewhere in the range of 10,000 troops from various other nations have been required, not to totally defeat the insurgency, but to reduce it to the point where progress can be made in the country. Taking into account the temporary nature of the American escalation and the growing strength of the Sons of Iraq movement, between 600,000 and 650,000 men under arms have been required just to allow the opportunity for progress. To boot, much of this success relies on the good will of currently dormant militias that have combined numbers in the tens of thousands.

Notice the difference in size between Iraq and the combined nations of Sudan, Chad, and the Central African Republic

The minimum area that must be controlled by the DPKF is over 10 times Iraq's size. Assuming that the combined military force of all three nations and all militant groups, plus foreign terrorist groups that will surely arrive to counter Western influence, will prove to be only as dangerous as the militant groups currently active in Iraq, and assuming that the current situation in Iraq is the desired first phase of the future for Darfur, 6-6.5 million troops will be required for the DPKF, along with a Naval force in the Red Sea that will consist of at lead two American Carrier Groups. A force of this size will by no means totally secure the region, but it is the required size for achieving relative control over most of the territory. Anything less than this will make it impossible to adequately protect all major population centers and resources, will leave a porous and unprotected border, and will allow belligerents the luxury of safe havens where there are no available troops to patrol.

A military force of this size is an impossible undertaking. It would require a total commitment by every major world power, the whole of NATO, and the African Union to have anywhere close to that number of soldiers just on paper. Without a doubt, America, and any other committed nation that does not currently have a military draft, will require one. The logistical demands for such a force would be so great that it would be beyond the capabilities of any alliance. Even if reality were to temporarily step aside and allow such a force to be assembled and supplied, the costs of keeping so large a force in the field would mean that all nations involved would face bankruptcy in a matter of months.

Since this minimum size for the guarantee of a minimum level of success is beyond the capabilities of the whole of humanity, and certainly beyond the willpower of the American public, any peacekeeping mission must accept that they cannot stop the violence or end the genocide. The best that can be hoped for is that a much smaller DPKF can create a safe haven for refugees. It would be like Srebrenica during the Balkans Conflict, but it would be much larger. Such a fortified safe haven would be totally dependent on a permanent military force. Should the contributing nations ever require their soldiers for the benefit of their own nations the mass of refugees would be totally vulnerable to attack from those who forced them to seek shelter in the first place. When this happened in the Balkans, 8,000 people were killed the moment peace keepers withdrew. On the scale that would probably exist in Darfur, tens, maybe even hundreds of thousands could die. Not only would the refugees be totally and permanently dependent on the DPKF for their survival, but they would be forced into a small area of land by strategic need for a totally secure perimeter. This prevents the population from establishing agriculture or industry, ensuring their perpetual dependency on foreign food aid, medical aid, and basic tools for living, as well as all other nonrenewable resources, such as fuel for cooking fires and potable water.

Since the fact remains that a military intervention will be seen as an act of war by whatever nation has been invaded, either a deal must be brokered, which is unlikely, or a military campaign will have to be waged to destroy that nations capacity to endanger safe zones. This could destabilize that government and may result in the total collapse of centralized government, since nations like Chad are barely holding on the a central government as it is. If central governments collapse, the result would likely be a mirror image of Somalia, where feudal warlords and Islamic clerics, turned politicians, fight for resources and territory, while the people starve and are caught in the cross-fire.

Ignoring this all too likely result of even a moderate sized intervention. this total and unending dependency on the DPKF for protection, and foreign aid for all other aspects of living make this solution as bad or worse than doing nothing at all. It forces refugees to rely on the outside world for every aspect of their existence and forces them into unproductive lives. By not getting involved, the world powers may be ignoring a genocide, but they do give the victims of this conflict the gift of self dependency. Where an intervention would be impossible on a large scale, and would create a parasitic society on a smaller scale, nonintervention would force those being brutalized to develop solutions for themselves. Instead of relying on a perpetual military presence from other world powers, they will be forced to learn to defend themselves.

Instead of living on a reservation where minimal to no food can be grown, and where negligible quantities of other goods can be produced, they will be free to defend however much land they have the capacity to hold, where food can be grown. As bad a feeling as it may give many people, a more lasting solution may be found by embracing this conflict. Populations under threat from militias or oppressive governments should be given military aid, and basic instructions on how to use the weapons they have. Just as they must be taught to fish instead of being fed by others forever, they must learn to protect themselves, not rely on the protection of foreign military forces. Once those facing genocide are able to defend their land and assets, and kill those who have sought their annihilation, the violence will lessen.

The Darfur Conflict, Part One: Humanitarian Aid and the Army Corps of Engineers

On campuses across America, student activists are calling for American intervention in Darfur. The genocide occurring there has become one of the latest political fads. “Save Darfur” shirts and information booths are a common sight, but finding someone who actually understands the depths of the conflict there is a harder task. Even finding someone who knows exactly what they mean when they call for action by the American government is difficult. Some want economic trade embargoes to be put on Sudan, while others want all nations involved to be part of a collective embargo. Some want America to send an unprecedented aid package in humanitarian aid, and still many more just want America to do “something.” What that something is, is anyone’s guess.

Some even want a NATO military force to be sent to Darfur to try and end the violence. What this really means, whether they realize it or not, is that they want an American military intervention, since the military might of all other NATO member nations combined would not have the manpower to even begin to take on this task with only a proportional American force along side them. An American military intervention or a mass aid package are both idealistic solutions and are nonviable options in the real world. In this first of a two part Article on Darfur, a non-military solution will be shown as impossible to achieve and harmful to even attempt.

Sending millions of tons of flour, rice, and other food supplies into famine struck regions of Africa has been a favored method of dealing with the problems gripping the continent for decades, while the amount of money spent on aid to third world countries has been a quick way to boost a donating nation’s status with the world. A simple look at the countries that receive this aid seems to indicate that this system does not work. At best it is a tremendous effort for short-term benefit and no long-term solution. At worst, it exacerbates the problems that any aid package hopes to solve.

This is just a large-scale version of the old saying, “if you give a man a fish he’ll eat for a day, but if you teach a man to fish he’ll eat for a lifetime.” Sending massive food shipments to parts of Africa that are facing famine, generally, is never enough to even prevent all starvation deaths, but even worse is the dependency it causes. As a result of food, literally, falling from the sky, many farmers stop trying to cultivate the land. What’s the use if the crops often fail and America and Europe will feed the population better than farming ever could? So now the food aid can’t ever really end the famines, gives an incentive to farmers to stop working, which prolongs and worsens the famines, and the result is that this food aid promotes over population in areas that, clearly, cannot support the number of people currently residing there.

Aid must be coupled with the building of infrastructure so that the population can feed itself. Agricultural infrastructure is vitally important to the survival of any region’s population. Irrigation, larger canals, the capacity to produce fertilizer and the safest possible pesticides locally, and agriculture tools and equipment are all needed, as are crops that can produce best in whatever region is being modernized. Desertification is also a threat that needs to be countered in many regions with hearty plant growth that is permanent, and not part of a food crop that is dug up and replanted every year. Innovative methods of increasing food production and food diversity are needed to not only feed a greater portion of the population, but also help build up people's immune systems. Crop cycles should be established that replenish the nutrients in the soil will help prevent future crop failures, while canals and livestock watering ponds can have hearty fish species introduced. Livestock should be bred to improve the survivability and the nutritional value of animals. All of this means that when a region is facing famine, they need the Army Corps of Engineers just as badly, or more so, than they need protein powder dropped from a cargo plane.

Unfortunately for Darfur, the Army Corps of Engineers wouldn’t be on the job long before certain groups of people started shooting at them. For any infrastructure building projects to occur, a certain level of security must be won first. Since food aid won’t solve the problem and will probably be stolen by anyone with a gun to be sold for more weapons, and since Darfur is a war zone that is far too active for the massive building projects that would be required to give this region any hope of future prosperity to occur, only two options seem to remain. America and the outside world can do nothing and let the natives fight each other, as they have for decades, until one side finally wins and the genocide is taken to its bloody conclusion, or a massive foreign military force can be sent into Africa to engage and destroy all of the many combatants, or at least force them to accept a cease-fire. This is an impossible undertaking that America could never hope to achieve, even if Iraq had never been invaded. This military option will be the subject of the second article.