tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-63497122349646934052024-02-19T08:56:47.856-08:00History and War<i>Parta Victoriis Pax</i> (peace is born from victories)
-Augustus, first Emperor of RomeE.T. Baileyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14369204396507186919noreply@blogger.comBlogger12125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6349712234964693405.post-54699266398625385182010-03-29T21:20:00.001-07:002010-03-29T21:37:24.077-07:00I've Moved!Due to Google being incredibly non-user friendly and filled with technical bugs, I have moved locations to my own website. I have compiled all the articles from this site, as well as my articles from the Sri Lanka Guardian dating back to mid-2008 at http://AmericanDecembrist.com<br /><br />Named after the famous Decembrist Revolt of 1825, I continue to discuss political and military issues, both in Sri Lanka, the United States, and around the globe through my bias in favor of personal liberty, individual responsibility, and constitutionally limited government. <br /><br />I hope to see your comments on my new articles there as it was such a moving and priviledged experience here. <br /><br />Regards,<br />E.T. BaileyE.T. Baileyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14369204396507186919noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6349712234964693405.post-61114593043277252642008-10-21T22:39:00.000-07:002008-10-21T22:54:22.586-07:00On the Process of Detigerfication<p class="MsoNormal">I would like to take a departure from my usual discussion of military issues and discuss the matter of preventing a return to war when the current conflict ends.<span style=""> </span>This task is of critical importance to the future of Sri Lanka, and I feel it must be addressed before the current fighting is concluded.<span style=""> </span></p> <p class="MsoNormal">With Sri Lankan soldiers pouring into the Wanni from all directions, the LTTE is facing extinction.<span style=""> </span>While the war is far from over, plans must be made on how to deal with the population of the separatist heartland once the LTTE has been eliminated as a conventional fighting force.<span style=""> </span>A plan for reconstruction and reconciliation is vital to the success of whatever peace follows this terrible conflict.<span style=""> </span>The most pressing issue of the postwar reconstruction will be the question of what to do with LTTE military veterans, political figures, and any other Tamils who actively supported the rebel group during the war.<span style=""> </span>This challenge may be as daunting as defeating the LTTE in the first place, and will define what kind of country Sri Lanka will be for the rest of its existence.<span style=""> </span></p> <p class="MsoNormal">An understanding of history will only serve to help Sri Lankans develop solutions for this problem.<span style=""> </span>Two excellent examples are the period of reconstruction following the American Civil War and the German process of denazification after the end of World War Two.<span style=""> </span>It is from this later example that I have derived the name, “detigerfication” to describe the task facing Sri Lanka.<span style=""> </span>Through these examples we can see three primary issues regarding enemy veterans.<span style=""> </span>First, the war crimes trials of Nazis at Nuremberg should be studied as Sri Lanka forms a judicial task force to bring to justice members of the LTTE accused of war crimes.<span style=""> </span>Second, the treatment and legal status that former Nazis and Confederates faced in their respective countries should be examined and an appropriate system developed for Sri Lanka.<span style=""> </span>Finally, the way the United States and Germany dealt with the cultural aspects of their conflicts offer insight into Sri Lanka’s cultural future.<span style=""><br /></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><a onblur="try {parent.deselectBloggerImageGracefully();} catch(e) {}" href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjCi03IrwcFzhXLVF6FS6toMNKeqlFNm264LBHSFPX_lWsNGy4IXYxx3yBrw4t3av-39vn1R3j570jY4xclQw9vnTEs7ptEBMnkXRazm8N6HSNl-IksYo1K08evVJ6uTR7eHjqYaRbttsYR/s1600-h/nuremberg-trials.jpg"><img style="margin: 0px auto 10px; display: block; text-align: center; cursor: pointer;" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjCi03IrwcFzhXLVF6FS6toMNKeqlFNm264LBHSFPX_lWsNGy4IXYxx3yBrw4t3av-39vn1R3j570jY4xclQw9vnTEs7ptEBMnkXRazm8N6HSNl-IksYo1K08evVJ6uTR7eHjqYaRbttsYR/s320/nuremberg-trials.jpg" alt="" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5259849346132442194" border="0" /></a></p><p class="MsoNormal"> </p><p style="text-align: center;" class="MsoNormal"><span class="imgcaptionxxsml"><span style="font-size:78%;">Nazi war criminals standing trial in the first row</span><br /></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span class="imgcaptionxxsml">The Nuremberg Trials following World War Two tried and convicted many Nazis, executing some and imprisoning others, for war crimes committed against enemy civilian populations, as well as their own citizens during the war.<span style=""> </span>Sri Lanka will undoubtedly have some such special judicial organization established to deal with LTTE war criminals, and most Sri Lankans would probably cheer at the thought of </span>Velupillai Prabhakaran being tried and hung for his role in numerous LTTE atrocities.<span style=""> </span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><!--[if !supportEmptyParas]--> <!--[endif]--><o:p></o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal">However, while Sri Lanka should enter into this judicial operation with the hope of bringing war criminals to justice, effort should be made to avoid punishing individuals solely for being members of the LTTE, or being members of s certain rank.<span style=""> </span>Rebels who ordered or participated in war crimes should be hunted down, regardless of their rank.<span style=""> </span>If there is not enough credible evidence to indict a surrendered LTTE officer of a war crime, even if it is a high-ranking colonel, then he should be allowed to live out his life in peace.<span style=""> </span>If a conscript is suspected of killing civilians, then they should be tried and punished if convicted.<span style=""> </span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><!--[if !supportEmptyParas]--> <!--[endif]--><o:p></o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal">For example, if a rebel is known to have been present at the Battle of Mullativu, he is simply a war veteran.<span style=""> </span>If he is also known to have participated in the murder of surrendered Sri Lankan soldiers after the base fell, he should then be prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law.<span style=""> </span>It is of utmost importance that the postwar trials be an exercise in justice, not a witch hunt. To achieve this, the government should declare a general amnesty to all members of the LTTE with the condition that this does not absolve them from being guilty of any of war crimes.<span style=""> </span>This partial amnesty will not excuse the actions of war criminals, but will ensure that tens of thousands of Tamils who acted in good conscience during the war will not be persecuted by a court of vengeance.<span style=""> </span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><!--[if !supportEmptyParas]--> <!--[endif]--><o:p></o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal">The question of what to do with LTTE veterans goes beyond prosecuting those suspected of war crimes.<span style=""> </span>There is also a matter of their political and economic future.<span style=""> </span>In postwar Germany, the Allied Powers clamped down on former Nazis both as a means of preventing the Nazi Party’s survival after the war and as a means of retribution against the world’s most hated political group.<span style=""> </span>Regardless of their education or skill, the only legal jobs former Nazi Party members could have in Europe were manual labor jobs.<span style=""> </span>The two highest (out of four) classes of offenders were also banned from voting and running for public office.<span style=""> </span>American general George Patton was fired from his postwar position in Germany because of his opposition to this system.<span style=""> </span>He argued that most Nazi Party members had not committed war crimes and were the most, if not the only, Germans qualified to work in government positions.<span style=""> </span>This was only one aspect of a collective punishment system where the Allies blamed all Germans for the war and the Holocaust.<span style=""> </span>Nazi literature, symbols, and other objects reminding Germans of the Nazi Party were also destroyed in an attempt to totally erase Nazism from German society.<span style=""> </span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><!--[if !supportEmptyParas]--> <!--[endif]--><o:p></o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal">Sri Lanka should think twice before taking such a hardliner’s stance on reconstruction.<span style=""> </span>Unlike Germany after World War Two, Tamils in Sri Lanka are unlikely to adopt an intense guilt complex because there is no event, like the Holocaust, that clearly marks their bid for independence as evil.<span style=""> </span>Many will argue that both sides committed war crimes, leaving only political perspective to decide who, if anyone, was fighting on the side of righteousness.<span style=""> </span>The result will be that a great many Tamils will be proud of their LTTE heritage and will continue to support the ideals they fought for, even if Tamil Eelam will never come to pass.<span style=""> </span>Will Sri Lanka deny voting rights to a huge portion of Sri Lankan Tamils because of this?<span style=""> </span>Will these same Tamils be limited by the government to the least prestigious jobs in the country?<span style=""> </span>Fortunately, the liberation of The East is proving Sri Lanka’s willingness to include former enemies in the government.<span style=""> </span>The once ludicrous idea of Colonel Karuna, the rebel leader who led the final assault on Elephant Pass, becoming a member of the Sri Lankan government is now a reality.<span style=""> </span>Successful elections in the East give further hope that Reconstruction in the North will be a successful exercise in democracy.<span style=""> </span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><!--[if !supportEmptyParas]--> <!--[endif]--><o:p></o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal">It is of vital importance that the people in the Wanni do not suffer from large unemployment rates.<span style=""> </span>Poor individuals who cannot find lawful employment will be vulnerable to recruitment by guerillas, especially if they have families to feed.<span style=""> </span>The same risk applies to children.<span style=""> </span>The education system must be reestablished as soon as possible, once the major fighting has ended.<span style=""> </span>Special attention should be given towards helping child veterans adjust to civilian life and assisting them in getting an education.<span style=""> </span>The transition from military to civilian life is difficult for people of any age, but will be even harder for the thousands of child soldiers who will survive the war.<span style=""> </span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><!--[if !supportEmptyParas]--> <!--[endif]--><o:p></o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal">Sri Lanka might do well to consider a policy closer to the reconstruction process in America in this regard, though this example also has aspects that should be avoided.<span style=""> </span>President Andrew Johnson, who took the presidency following the death of President Abraham Lincoln, declared a general amnesty for all Southern citizens who took an oath of allegiance to the United States.<span style=""> </span>This option to have a full return to citizenship in return for, what was basically a promise to not wage war against the state, greatly helped reduce the level of partisan violence during Reconstruction.<span style=""> </span>However, the exclusion of Confederate officers, political officials, and wealthy landowners from this amnesty has a counter effect, intensifying Southern hatred for the Union and Northern citizens.<span style=""> </span>This hatred was furthered by the passing of the 14<sup>th</sup> Amendment, which stated that no rebel or supporter of the Confederacy could be elected to public office.<span style=""> </span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><!--[if !supportEmptyParas]--> <!--[endif]--><o:p></o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal">This general amnesty, as already stated, is of critical importance as it offers a future to the tens of thousands of Tamils who acted honorably during their participation in the war.<span style=""> </span>Establishing a means for people to appeal their exclusion from the amnesty also has merit, as there will always be flaws in large-scale policies.<span style=""> </span>Not only is this a fair and just move, but also an act to ensure a lasting peace.<span style=""> </span>By allowing tens of thousands of former rebels the option to have civilian lives with full rights and no threat of legal or military retribution, they will be much more likely to accept reunification.<span style=""> </span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><!--[if !supportEmptyParas]--> <!--[endif]--><o:p></o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal">While the persecution of landowners in the American South hardly applies to Sri Lanka, there are other, more relevant, aspects of Southern Reconstruction that Sri Lanka would do well to avoid or modify.<span style=""> </span>Sri Lanka should be able to make the distinction between top tier LTTE leaders and LTTE public servants who are the only people with any administrative experience in the region.<span style=""> </span>Banning what amounted to nearly every known public figure in The South created long lasting bitter sentiments in the former Confederacy and the same would likely be true in the Wanni.<span style=""> </span>Sri Lanka should recognize, just as Patton did in Germany, the need for experienced political workers who have had an existing relationship with the local population.<span style=""> </span>Imposing an appointed government from Colombo or forcing Tamils to pick representatives from a tiny pool of pre-approved individuals will do little more than help the LTTE remnants recruit people for guerilla action.<span style=""> </span>There is also the threat of showing favor towards Eastern Tamils over their Northern kin.<span style=""> </span>Former rebels dominate government in the East and Northern Tamils should be given similar accommodations.<span style=""> </span>Granted the East is being run by defectors, while the North would be run by surrendered, but loyal rebels, however, showing favor towards Eastern Tamils will encourage Northern Tamils to continue the war as partisans.<span style=""> </span>As long as Sri Lankan Tamils, or certain groups of Tamils, feel that the rest of the island is subjugating them, there will always be people willing to plant bombs and assassinate politicians.<span style=""><br /></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><a onblur="try {parent.deselectBloggerImageGracefully();} catch(e) {}" href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjSqGxAzDv2WzpSC_V2h50avdffLmLt5SMcKyVvI6fh9X6F43iVY1owDKOo9CNo9N59pC9aLULanog101_XqwGSR4tBIZUY_u0FyXVZXhi7-ZrtwDqDfVaUX5CBQbnsXCknUVfGiFDfrTf1/s1600-h/Confederate-Flag-VietNam-M113.jpg"><img style="margin: 0px auto 10px; display: block; text-align: center; cursor: pointer;" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjSqGxAzDv2WzpSC_V2h50avdffLmLt5SMcKyVvI6fh9X6F43iVY1owDKOo9CNo9N59pC9aLULanog101_XqwGSR4tBIZUY_u0FyXVZXhi7-ZrtwDqDfVaUX5CBQbnsXCknUVfGiFDfrTf1/s320/Confederate-Flag-VietNam-M113.jpg" alt="" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5259849591538410946" border="0" /></a></p><p class="MsoNormal"> </p><p style="text-align: center;" class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:78%;">Americans from The South are famous for taking the Confederate flag into battle in every war after the Civil War ended. Here, Southern soldiers carry the flag into battle during the Vietnam War. </span><br /></p><p class="MsoNormal">The Sri Lankan Civil War is a culturally defining event that will not simply go away with the fall of the LTTE.<span style=""> </span>Tens of thousands of LTTE veterans and their families will make up a large portion of every Tamil community, and a great many will view them as heroic fighters of a lost cause.<span style=""> </span>The simple fact of the matter is that the LTTE’s goal of a separate state enjoyed wide support from the Tamil people, and that will not change with the end of the war.<span style=""> </span>Sri Lankans must choose between accepting this new aspect of Tamil culture, or fighting it at every turn in an attempt to eradicate it from society.<span style=""> </span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><!--[if !supportEmptyParas]--> <!--[endif]--><o:p></o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal">To put the decision in a different light, Sri Lankans must choose between two futures for their country.<span style=""> </span>They can ban the Tiger flag and Tiger uniforms, outlaw the construction of historical monuments and museums to the rebel cause, and discourage Tamil communities from celebrating Hero’s Day.<span style=""> </span>This will certainly make several non-Tamil Sri Lankans feel better, since the last thing they want is for the LTTE to have remembrance shrines on the land so many loyal Sri Lankans gave their lives to liberate.<span style=""> </span>The drawbacks, however, would be a continued, possibly intensified, feeling of persecution among Sri Lankan Tamils and their permanent hatred of the rest of Sri Lanka for being forced to forsake their fallen loved ones.<span style=""> </span>Given the fragile nature of the post LTTE peace, it would likely be a key factor in a return to war.<span style=""> </span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><!--[if !supportEmptyParas]--> <!--[endif]--><o:p></o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal">Alternatively, Sri Lankans can accept this new aspect of Tamil culture as a natural result of having fought so long and hard, both for their cause and for the more instinctual desire to protect their homes and families.<span style=""> </span>After all, the reasons wars are fought and the reasons people fight wars are often very different.<span style=""> </span>An example the late American Civil War historian Shelby Foote once mentioned that fits very well with the Sri Lankan conflict involved a conversation between a Union soldier and a captured Confederate.<span style=""> </span>The Union man asked why the Confederate was fighting, to which the he replied, “Because you’re down here.”<span style=""> </span>With this example in mind, it’s easy to see how the average fighting man often does not risk his life for the grand political goals of nations and empires, but to protect home and hearth.<span style=""> </span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><!--[if !supportEmptyParas]--> <!--[endif]--><o:p></o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal">Tolerating Tamil pride for the struggle and sacrifices that people from every Tamil community have participated in does not legitimize the LTTE, but instead acts as the extension of an olive branch.<span style=""> </span>Sri Lanka, by allowing Tamils to honor and remember their fallen loved ones, will send the message that all those lost in this war, even those who carried arms against the state, make up a national tragedy that must never be forgotten.<span style=""> </span>While this will almost certainly result in the symbolism of the LTTE becoming forever entrenched in Sri Lankan Tamil culture, it does not mean that Tamil separatism will forever flourish, and indeed it may help restore Tamil pride in Sri Lanka in a matter of decades instead of a matter of centuries.<span style=""><br /></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><a onblur="try {parent.deselectBloggerImageGracefully();} catch(e) {}" href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj3cnbq48wXIkTplj5Pzjz1VxuNEhVA0UfGu1d6pr8I3jSAO12tWW2EJQF1Buo2V321NR2UdOT-pcMP_c_6IUr0m16hwtFuXOjKz7CLBG6qxQnQGq_l6UxZVItYDrIZ_yyE_X-56oSljehg/s1600-h/Confederates+in+Afghanistan.jpg"><img style="margin: 0px auto 10px; display: block; text-align: center; cursor: pointer;" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj3cnbq48wXIkTplj5Pzjz1VxuNEhVA0UfGu1d6pr8I3jSAO12tWW2EJQF1Buo2V321NR2UdOT-pcMP_c_6IUr0m16hwtFuXOjKz7CLBG6qxQnQGq_l6UxZVItYDrIZ_yyE_X-56oSljehg/s320/Confederates+in+Afghanistan.jpg" alt="" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5259849699127791650" border="0" /></a></p><p class="MsoNormal"> </p><p style="text-align: center;" class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:78%;">Confederates in Afghanistan</span><br /></p><p class="MsoNormal">This can certainly be seen in American culture.<span style=""> </span>The American South made the transition from separatism to patriotism, despite holding fierce pride for their rebel heritage, all while Civil War veterans were still alive.<span style=""> </span>Southerners now make up the majority of the American Armed forces and have taken Confederate flags to war with them in every conflict since the Civil War.<span style=""> </span>A confederate flag flew over Shuri Castle in the Battle of Okinawa during World War two, was as common as the American flag in Vietnam, and has flown over Iraq in two wars now.<span style=""> </span>In Korea, North Koreans and Chinese troops were baffled by the Confederate flag and continually failed to determine what UN member nation the flag represented.<span style=""> </span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><!--[if !supportEmptyParas]--> <!--[endif]--><o:p></o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal">I can only hope Sri Lanka will have the good fortune of having Tamil soldiers hide Tiger flags in their helmets while risking their lives for a united Sri Lanka fifty years from now.<span style=""> </span>To achieve this same combination of nationalism and pride in one’s heritage in Sri Lanka would be remarkable.<span style=""> </span>Without a doubt it can be done.<span style=""> </span>The only question is whether or not the rest of Sri Lanka is willing to truly bury the hatchet when the shooting stops.<span style=""> </span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><!--[if !supportEmptyParas]--> <!--[endif]--><o:p></o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal">As a closing thought, I’d like to share a famous quote by President Lincoln, in the hopes that the attitude he expressed will prevail in Sri Lanka:<span style=""> </span></p> <p class="MsoNormal"><!--[if !supportEmptyParas]--> <!--[endif]--><o:p></o:p></p> <p class="MsoNormal">“With malice toward none; with charity for all; with firmness in the right, as God gives us to see the right, let us strive on to finish the work we are in; to bind up the nation's wounds; to care for him who shall have borne the battle, and for his widow, and his orphan—to do all which may achieve and cherish, a just and a lasting peace, among ourselves, and with all nations.”<br />— President Abraham Lincoln</p>E.T. Baileyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14369204396507186919noreply@blogger.com19tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6349712234964693405.post-8269148423377156492008-09-11T20:21:00.000-07:002008-09-19T19:46:41.292-07:00Racing Against the Clock: The LTTE’s Logistical Gamble<p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family:georgia;"><span style="font-size:100%;"><span style="color:black;">By making no serious attempt to retain the Wanni’s Western coastline in Mannar District until Nachchikuda, which has effectively crippled even minor arms shipments into rebel territory, the LTTE is gambling that it can reverse its loses in the Wanni Campaign with the supplies they currently have stockpiled. This has given them the benefit of not having to stand and fight when they don’t want to, but the cost of failure will be catastrophic to the separatist cause. Even if the LTTE does have the military capacity to eventually turn the tide of this war back to their favor and recapture lost territory, they risk losing everything on the eve of victory when they run out of critical supplies. In short, they risk a tropical El Alamein.</span></span><span style="font-size:100%;"><span style="color:black;"> </span></span></p><span style=";font-family:georgia;font-size:100%;color:black;" > <a onblur="try {parent.deselectBloggerImageGracefully();} catch(e) {}" href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEguAJm5VpfRWUCyFCFExcHXTxDa-4oJmk15SKLLM6pYeVyJ3YwTdvDqokvsm-3oUxLYqa9JBG25bbT6cGK0Ho4FTPDaOX6Y9ncNckfQ62jfzfQ3AG2Vx6yUaf1_Ri_MmIBxoRHfOSCdFqL_/s1600-h/Rommel.jpg"><img style="margin: 0px auto 10px; display: block; text-align: center; cursor: pointer;" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEguAJm5VpfRWUCyFCFExcHXTxDa-4oJmk15SKLLM6pYeVyJ3YwTdvDqokvsm-3oUxLYqa9JBG25bbT6cGK0Ho4FTPDaOX6Y9ncNckfQ62jfzfQ3AG2Vx6yUaf1_Ri_MmIBxoRHfOSCdFqL_/s320/Rommel.jpg" alt="" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5244973168653623586" border="0" /></a></span><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family:georgia;"><span style="font-size:100%;"><span style="color:black;">In World War Two, General Erwin Rommel led Germany’s Afrika Korps to the verge of victory, only to be utterly defeated due to critical supply shortages.<span style=""> </span>Despite winning a string of victories from Libya to Egypt that gave him control of most of North Africa, Rommel was fighting a campaign in which he was technically the underdog.<span style=""> </span>It certainly didn’t look like that at the time, but the Commonwealth Forces enjoyed far greater numbers, more supplies, and had shorter and shorter supply lines throughout Rommel’s advance, while the opposite was true for the Germans.<span style=""> </span>To boot, the Germans had no real means of cutting the Allied supply lines, while the German lines were facing constant harassment from the air and the sea.<span style=""> </span></span></span></p><span style=";font-family:georgia;font-size:100%;color:black;" > </span><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family:georgia;"><span style="font-size:100%;"><span style="color:black;">At the first and second battles of El-Alamein, this supply shortfall first prevented Rommel from breaking the back of the Allies and capturing the Nile, and later allowed the Allies to totally break his army in a counter attack the Germans didn’t have the capacity to resist.</span></span></p><span style=";font-family:georgia;font-size:100%;color:black;" > </span><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family:georgia;"><span style="font-size:100%;"><span style="color:black;">In the Wanni, the situation is somewhat different, but does bear a striking similarity to the German high water mark in the North Africa Campaign.<span style=""> </span>If the LTTE does launch a do or die counter offensive before the end, its strategy and objectives will be along the same lines as Rommel’s were at El Alamein and will face an almost identical supply crisis.<span style=""> </span>They will seek to capture strategic coastal territory and large population centers in Mannar and Kilinochchi Districts, inflict heavy casualties on the Sri Lankan Army, and capture large quantities of supplies from Sri Lankan troops.<span style=""> </span>The price of failure is likewise similar.<span style=""> </span>If they don't achieve every one of these objectives, they will likely collapse as a conventional fighting force very quickly after their offensive is defeated or runs out of steam.</span></span></p><span style=";font-family:georgia;font-size:100%;color:black;" > </span><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family:georgia;"><span style="font-size:100%;"><span style="color:black;">The LTTE's gamble, like Rommel's, is a race against time to win a decisive victory before supply shortages and casualties not only force them to abandon their offensive, but make further conventional resistance impossible.</span></span></p><span style=";font-family:georgia;font-size:100%;color:black;" > </span><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family:georgia;"><span style="font-size:100%;"><span style="color:black;">The LTTE is being compressed like a spring.<span style=""> </span>It is their hope that when the time is right they will rapidly expand and push back the Sri Lankan forces in a crushing victory.<span style=""> </span>To ensure the maximum probability of success, the LTTE have taken special care in how they retreat.<span style=""> </span>Several factors can turn a retreat from a sign of defeat into a strategy for victory.<span style=""> </span>Rommel recognized these factors and was able to take advantage of them to benefit his soldiers even after conquering North Africa was no longer possible.<span style=""> </span>After his defeat at El Alamein, Rommel’s objectives changed from defeating the enemy, to ensuring the maximum number of troops escape to Europe as possible.<span style=""> </span>Despite the impending fall of North Africa, he was able to save a large portion of the Afrika Korps by organizing a disciplined retreat.<span style=""> </span>This was Germany’s silver lining in an otherwise total defeat.</span></span></p><span style=";font-family:georgia;font-size:100%;color:black;" > </span><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family:georgia;"><span style="font-size:100%;"><span style="color:black;">While the LTTE have been falling back ahead of a major offensive instead of at the end of one, they too have led an orderly retreat.<span style=""> </span>They have retained unit cohesion for the most part, ensuring that their veteran units will be available for a future offensive.<span style=""> </span>They have also kept the Sri Lankan Army at bay with minor skirmishing and minefields, just like Rommel did on the march back to Tunisia.<span style=""> </span>They have even been able to boost the morale of their troops, despite the constant advance of the Sri Lankan Army, with high profile raids that usually have little or no strategic implications.<span style=""> </span>The LTTE’s Air Force, for example, has become a source of pride for the rebels, despite having almost nothing to show for their efforts.</span></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family:georgia;"><span style=";font-size:100%;color:black;" ><a onblur="try {parent.deselectBloggerImageGracefully();} catch(e) {}" href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg-uNVb-HsGaaDI8O_un23KorpUKiWSqK6INU7eif5xPqhQZHhauJEJtJ15pVail6JfPR2SEXbQtsJNIRFvF2zJzI5zu1g-fenO8JkbFbHMJQ0uDBhYKp5HyaoaNlqvhpBWRThLylyO8mqd/s1600-h/artillery.jpg"><img style="margin: 0px auto 10px; display: block; text-align: center; cursor: pointer;" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg-uNVb-HsGaaDI8O_un23KorpUKiWSqK6INU7eif5xPqhQZHhauJEJtJ15pVail6JfPR2SEXbQtsJNIRFvF2zJzI5zu1g-fenO8JkbFbHMJQ0uDBhYKp5HyaoaNlqvhpBWRThLylyO8mqd/s320/artillery.jpg" alt="" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5244973681142619730" border="0" /></a></span></p><span style=";font-family:georgia;font-size:100%;color:black;" > </span><p style="text-align: center;font-family:georgia;" class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:100%;"><span style="color:black;">Artillery piece captured by the LTTE at Mullativu.</span><span style="color:black;"><br /></span></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family:georgia;"><span style="font-size:100%;"><span style="color:black;">There is one thing the LTTE has achieved that Rommel was unable to do.<span style=""> </span>The LTTE has retained most of their heavy weapons, despite losing huge swaths of territory.<span style=""> </span>This will greatly benefit any committed offensive or defensive operation by giving LTTE infantry fire support that has already proven very effective in past operations.</span></span></p><span style=";font-family:georgia;font-size:100%;color:black;" > </span><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family:georgia;"><span style="font-size:100%;"><span style="color:black;">If and when the LTTE launches their major assault, the big guns that have mostly been captured from Sri Lankan forces in the past will be used much like the recent combined assault on a Sri Lankan radar array.<span style=""> </span>There, Black Tigers, LTTE regulars, artillery support, and the Air Tigers were deployed in the hopes of blinding the Sri Lankan Air Defense Network.<span style=""> </span>Superior judgment by Sri Lankan troops on the front line ensured that this operation was a failure and the destruction of a rebel bomber made this attack a costly mistake for the LTTE.<span style=""> </span>However, their ability to combine infantry, suicide commandoes, artillery, and air power for a single operation gives us a taste of what the LTTE offensive will look like.<span style=""> </span>It will be a coordinated effort by multiple combat elements to strike well defined targets and the casualties on both sides, at least initially, should be fairly evenly balanced, if not in the LTTE’s favor.</span></span></p><span style=";font-family:georgia;font-size:100%;color:black;" > Despite this success in preserving their forces for a major battle that they hope will turn the tide of the war, the LTTE is facing a worst-case scenario. With supply lines largely eliminated or constricted, they have only a short time to plan, launch, and win a major offensive before supply shortfalls cripple their ability to wage war. This offensive must result in the capture of large quantities of supplies and have a favorable casualty ratio to make any gains sustainable. The LTTE requires a flawlessly executed battle that may very well be the largest of the war and if they don’t get it, they will face extinction.<br /><br /><a onblur="try {parent.deselectBloggerImageGracefully();} catch(e) {}" href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEih0RL71MKBva6_ioDDMt3lAzt5Th3_dcHRdnPvzl0_Vku3JoTVYVcB_iP8ZBbyKYkqjuXQrUTQiP8MouP6zJ51y6jSiuFlU0KnAU9iFOzyRGy3eXcUlU8UAzBW3457rUy9Bcof11xpzQaf/s1600-h/rocket.jpg"><img style="margin: 0px auto 10px; display: block; text-align: center; cursor: pointer;" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEih0RL71MKBva6_ioDDMt3lAzt5Th3_dcHRdnPvzl0_Vku3JoTVYVcB_iP8ZBbyKYkqjuXQrUTQiP8MouP6zJ51y6jSiuFlU0KnAU9iFOzyRGy3eXcUlU8UAzBW3457rUy9Bcof11xpzQaf/s320/rocket.jpg" alt="" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5244974809823024290" border="0" /></a> </span><p style="text-align: center;font-family:georgia;" class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:100%;"><span style="color:black;">Multi-Barrel Rocket Launchers have been used by the SLA in the past to decimate LTTE offensives. </span></span><span style=";font-size:100%;color:black;" ><br /></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family:georgia;"><span style="font-size:100%;"><span style="color:black;">Opposing them, the Sri Lankan Armed Forces have never been stronger.<span style=""> </span>In the air, the Air Force has a large number of planes and helicopters to provide air support to soldiers on the ground.<span style=""> </span>On the ground, tens of thousands of Sri Lankan troops are deployed in front line positions, and tens of thousands more wait in reserve to contain any LTTE breakout attempt.<span style=""> </span>New Multi-Barrel Rocket Launchers allow Sri Lankan artillery units to sterilize large areas of the combat zone with a rain of missiles that the LTTE have never successfully countered.<span style=""> </span>Sri Lankan troops also enjoy secure supply lines and do not have to count on captured war materials to continue fighting.<span style=""> </span></span></span></p><span style=";font-family:georgia;font-size:100%;color:black;" > </span><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family:georgia;"><span style="font-size:100%;"><span style="color:black;">Despite their success in preserving key military units and heavy weapons, the deck is certainly stacked against the LTTE. While they field a capable, versatile, and innovative army, they are attempting to defeat an opponent that is well led, has superior numbers, superior technology, and superior supply lines. While they can certainly promise Sri Lanka a bloody battle, the odds of a major Sri Lankan defeat are shrinking with each passing day. What is certain is that, one way or another, this war is coming to an end and the fate of Sri Lanka and Tamil Eelam will be decided before the end of the year.</span></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="font-family:georgia;"><span style=";font-family:georgia;font-size:100%;" ><span style="color:black;">P.S. For a more detailed understanding of the strategies used at El Alamein and how they are being used in Sri Lanka, visit The Long Ranger's article <a href="http://sf-3.blogspot.com/2008/09/battle-of-el-alamein-lessons-from-past.html">here</a>.<br /></span></p>E.T. Baileyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14369204396507186919noreply@blogger.com22tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6349712234964693405.post-76403895055865949142008-08-16T22:46:00.000-07:002008-08-17T23:35:50.231-07:00Decisive Military Action for Long Term Benefit: The March on Vellankulam<div align="center"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgj1IVTry5inY2fbSKX_VQo8gVLo8Zd9OhYRyK00l-xx8tNjMJgShKtKCD_a6QgZ_s5AxX2W4NP26xHze3hm6JUFpJvfnsur3MnloEtHyX95LNqgaZOYiO06knkcVreEN_3iTdz5Hr_i2Qr/s1600-h/anaconda.bmp"><img id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5235362531423760290" style="margin: 0px auto 10px; display: block; text-align: center;" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgj1IVTry5inY2fbSKX_VQo8gVLo8Zd9OhYRyK00l-xx8tNjMJgShKtKCD_a6QgZ_s5AxX2W4NP26xHze3hm6JUFpJvfnsur3MnloEtHyX95LNqgaZOYiO06knkcVreEN_3iTdz5Hr_i2Qr/s320/anaconda.bmp" border="0" /></a> <span style="font-size:78%;">The Union's Anaconda Plan would be executed far differently than its designer, General Winfield Scott, had planned. However, the strategy did ultimately choke the life out of the South by denying her the supplies needed to wage war. </span></div><div align="left"><br /></div><div align="left">Constricting and cutting the enemy's supply lines has been a fundamental of military strategy throughout history. A siege or blockade can break what would otherwise be an unshakable armed force or defended location. The effectiveness of a siege or blockade depends on the level of commitment by the aggressor to such a strategy. The more resources and manpower are committed to a strategy of constriction, the more isolated a target becomes, allowing an army to capture prizes that would have been impossible to take by more direct means, often at a fraction of the cost.<br /><br />Siege and blockade strategies are critically important in the Sri Lankan Civil War. The most important battles of the war have been won or lost by the ability of one side to cut off the other's supply lines. The blockade of enemy waters is especially critical in this conflict because Sri Lanka is an island. The LTTE was able to capture the previously unbreakable Elephant Pass Base by amphibiously landing troops North of Elephant Pass, cutting the citadel off from the city of Jaffna. The crushing Sri Lankan defeat at Mullativu can also be at least partially attributed to the LTTE’s ability to cut off Sri Lankan garrison troops and a rescue task force by land and by sea.<br /><br />By contrast, the LTTE was able to withdrawal in good order after the 1995 capture of Jaffna, despite the fact that the Sri Lankan Army had, at one point before the operation, virtually surrounded the peninsula. The LTTE’s ability to punch a hole in the ring of Sri Lankan positions surrounding Jaffna at the Battle of Pooneryn two years eariler and the inability of the Sri Lankan Navy to create an area of naval supremacy around Jaffna prevented this major LTTE defeat from becoming a route.<br /><br />In the present Wanni Offensive, the Sri Lankan Army has used the threat of siege as a means of forcing the LTTE to abandon fortified positions and even entire towns. Adampan and the famous Madhu church are textbook worthy examples of this painfully slow, but difficult to counter, tactical deployment. With the LTTE slowly but surely running out of territory to retreat to, this tactic and the outcome it creates is likely to change in the coming months.<br /><br />More important than tactical sieges is the overall strategic siege of the Wanni. In this island conflict the ability of the Sri Lankan military to establish and maintain a strategic blockade will ensure the destruction of the LTTE as a conventional fighting force. Creating an effective blockade of LTTE territory has eluded Sri Lanka for most of the war, but in the last two years the military has matured their efforts to trap and isolate the LTTE. Since 2006, a strategy has been developed to form Sri Lanka's version of the famous Anaconda Plan. This plan uses three forms of blockade to slowly constrict the LTTE and has already had a strategic impact. From munitions rationing, to a general unwillingness to launch a counter offensive, a reduced flow of supplies into the Wanni has visibly changed the way the LTTE goes to war.<br /></div><div align="left"></div><div align="left"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiJJ_jLKozT2OMUXJNncTI2qU_HM9Ztddcu-yQa1SsKWnjVDPu-Hfo8ygxBRjL1Dc_JjUQrc8YcAn4nCyRSmZtIHjmVX7wdSUoYp8rvAx40BIWU2IXryi9CDg55DQSKs3CzM0gwQzjSizka/s1600-h/Semmes+and+Kell.jpg"><img id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5235360756836001474" style="margin: 0px auto 10px; display: block; text-align: center;" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiJJ_jLKozT2OMUXJNncTI2qU_HM9Ztddcu-yQa1SsKWnjVDPu-Hfo8ygxBRjL1Dc_JjUQrc8YcAn4nCyRSmZtIHjmVX7wdSUoYp8rvAx40BIWU2IXryi9CDg55DQSKs3CzM0gwQzjSizka/s320/Semmes+and+Kell.jpg" border="0" /></a></div><div align="center"><span style="font-size:78%;">Captain Raphael Semmes and his first officer John Kell on board the Confederate raider Alabama, which sank 61 American Merchant vessels around the world and one Federal cruiser off the coast of Galveston before being herself destroyed off the coast of France.</span></div><br />The three methods being used to blockade the Wanni are fairly simple in concept and most people could easily recognize a good example of each method if they saw one. The first is the use of commerce raiders. The German U-boats in the world wars and the Confederate raiders during the American Civil War are probably the most successful examples of this strategy. Despite its uncomplicated nature, few nations can actually execute a commerce raiding campaign because of the need for a "blue water navy." These operations generally occur far from any coastline and Sri Lanka's ability to not only try their hand at commerce raiding, but also succeed in totally destroying the LTTE's long range blockade running fleet has surprised and impressed the whole world. It should be noted though that commerce-raiding campaigns almost never win wars. They hurt the enemy, force them to change their own shipping strategies, and certainly put a great deal of pressure on the defensive party, but to win a war, shipping must be totally denied, not just harassed. After all, the two examples above were used by nations that lost the wars they fought.<br /><br /><div align="center"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjgM1g53VwZw6-GysY59mJ3P4Fwt99s8CasukSCQaAZlXRvLqg89cjDc1Cpw8Vx1d8AcgI_lz2mQb6AF6FAAEq92diWWFfA_pP1CjAuma4M-Fyil_JGn2YXGiF1xf917AOZYmQD3YBq8qEf/s1600-h/riad+map.jpg"><img id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5235359561404810050" style="margin: 0px auto 10px; display: block; text-align: center;" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjgM1g53VwZw6-GysY59mJ3P4Fwt99s8CasukSCQaAZlXRvLqg89cjDc1Cpw8Vx1d8AcgI_lz2mQb6AF6FAAEq92diWWFfA_pP1CjAuma4M-Fyil_JGn2YXGiF1xf917AOZYmQD3YBq8qEf/s320/riad+map.jpg" border="0" /></a><span style="font-size:78%;">This map made in October of 2007 shows how far the Sri Lankan Navy had to sail from the island to intercept the LTTE blockade-runners.</span> </div><div align="center"><br /><div align="left"></div><div align="left">The second method of blockade is the traditional coastal blockade where a fleet patrols an enemy's coastline to intercept shipping as it nears its destination or as it first departs for a mission abroad. The Sri Lankan Navy has had to make these "brown water navy" operations a priority now that the LTTE has lost its entire fleet of larger, long-range blockade-runners. Gunboat patrols have occasionally intercepted LTTE supply ships, but the Sri Lankan navy suffers, not only from traditional problems associated with a coastal blockade, but also with challenges unique to the Sri Lankan conflict.<br /><br />It is impossible to guard all avenues of approach to the Wanni all the time and so it is no surprise that small LTTE supply ships succeed in making the trip from Tamil Nadu to the Wanni fairly often. What further limits the Sri Lankan Navy's ability to cut the LTTE's supply lines is the large fishing fleets that work in the blockade zone. These large fleets are impossible to police and the LTTE uses these fleets to cover their blockade running activities. Unfortunately, without inflicting great hardship on the civilians in LTTE territory and probably violating the sovereignty of India, there is no way of fixing this problem by sea power alone.<br /><br />This brings us to the final and most effective means of blockading a hostile region: the use of ground forces to occupy coastal territory. Be it by capturing ports or simply threatening them with capture, the presence of an opposing army can stifle shipping in a region better than any other means. Sri Lanka's liberation of almost the entire East coast of the island in 2006 is the largest act of coastal denial of the war and without a doubt it has constricted LTTE resupply efforts. However, this area is more geographically isolated than the Wanni so the prime LTTE shipping routes and destinations remained in rebel hands. In just the past month though, the Sri Lankan Army has gone from a crawling advance in the island's interior, to a decisive advance along the coast of the Mannar District.<br /><br /></div><div align="center"></div><div align="center"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjGq1aW0kNxCxmuSY5IckPCbvIVxN-DfRyRfpNh2lz8LBM9aCdszE939dpaBp_tgIP9ONmGweT_yqkBVaAcUk2SeUPdUqUFtFQbvKdm6yDvrbQd0D1VZl6NDB0LXB1kU2PbTnn74kSTySU/s1600-h/MannarMap.jpg"><img id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5235359142023926066" style="margin: 0px auto 10px; display: block; text-align: center;" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEixtTn0BmKrqaeQhyphenhyphenX-nl4w6mBpCvGfViSEfO2EA95mZanO1Nsq64mv13IGM0VxXuUKhbUXvlaWLgnQ_l5FXOxRg2LPCyoQTWaXzEHdR1tC5loPF0y2hYpQiv-w68fkjbXleVz9scKCikqA/s320/MannarMap.jpg" border="0" /></a> <span style="font-size:78%;">Mannar Map,</span> <span style="font-size:78%;">click to enlarge. </span></div><div align="center"><br /></div><div align="left">In 17 days, the 58th Division, supported by Commando teams, captured 22 kilometers of coastal territory, crossed three medium sized rivers, and captured over half a dozen coastal towns, some of which were key rebel military bases. From the capture of Vidattaltivu near the mouth of the Nay River on July 16th, the 58th has advanced North a distance that would have taken many months at the rate of advance the Mannar Front has previously been accustomed to. The Parangi and Pali Rivers have both been crossed and their mouths secured, while Komputukki, Iluppaikkaddavai, Mundampiddi, and finally Vellankulam and the nearby harbor village of Thekampuddi were captured in just two and a half weeks. The 58th is continuing its Northward advance to this day, but their progress has again slowed, making Vellankulam the end point for this phase of the campaign. The next phase has already taken the town of Mulankavil and is targeting the major LTTE naval base at Nachchikuda, with an ultimate goal of capturing Pooneryn.<br /><br />This is exactly the kind of decisive coastal advance that has been advocated in previous posts on this site. In addition to other supplies and pieces of equipment, this drive has cost the LTTE dozens of ships. Some were captured and others were destroyed as they fled. Now not only are there fewer entry points for supplies from abroad, but there are fewer rebel warships to support resupply operations.<br /><br />The LTTE had three options that have been mentioned multiple times before, when this kind of push was nothing more than a concept. They could stand and fight a losing battle, retreat only to counterattack and suffer a rain of fire from MBRLs, or they could cut their losses and abandon a strategically vital region. They have done the last and are now attempting more delaying tactics along what remains of their Western coastline.<br /><br />Despite their refusal to put up a major fight for this important area, this advance is a strategic victory that deserves greater recognition than the defeat of the LTTE counterattack at Tunukkai, by far. It is unfortunate that public attention has been more focused on what was little more than a skirmish. Constricting the LTTE's ability to resupply their forces and cutting the Vellankulam-Mallavi road that served to transport those supplies from the coast to Kilinochchi District has long-term implications for the Wanni Campaign. The LTTE will recover from the loss of a hundred fighters without too much trouble since it is a force with thousands of troops and tens of thousands of potential soldiers in the population it controls. They will not recover nearly so easily from the loss of strategic harbors and supply roads. The entire LTTE will feel these losses, especially since the Wanni has almost no weapons production capacity, where only a single unit would feel the loss of a soldier, and this hurt will last and intensify for as long as Sri Lankan soldiers occupy these towns. </div></div>E.T. Baileyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14369204396507186919noreply@blogger.com12tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6349712234964693405.post-17914509630674312522008-05-21T21:56:00.000-07:002008-05-21T23:23:06.557-07:00Jaffna and Fredericksburg: Part TwoThe repeated failed offensives on the Jaffna Front are perhaps the clearest proof that the Sri Lankan military requires a new path to victory.<span style=""> </span>Sri Lanka requires a multi-phased change in strategy if the civil war plaguing the nation is to be won. Certainly this new strategy should be partially based on standard strategic issues such as the concentration of enemy weapons, troops, and fortifications. This will ensure that the Sri Lankan Army will never again squander the lives of its soldiers on the impossible objective of breaking though the Jaffna Front. However, there also needs to be a fundamental shift in the mindset of Sri Lankan officers, both in regards to their objectives, and their tactics. Preventing disasters ensures that Sri Lanka will not lose the war, but only a major overhaul of the military’s strategic objectives and tactical philosophy will allow the war to be won. <p style="text-align: center;" class="MsoNormal"><a onblur="try {parent.deselectBloggerImageGracefully();} catch(e) {}" href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjZVpbRzI50hclGIN1nIvxaqnRaFy6OKKfuJyrTjyBKAL4JAce9sU2e6I4JDGbbln5-RciwVNvR1GRS6r4XGB7a8Xb3yZxox2mIwc5CM7XALMyf3ks9F4jkdbZ5n61ezCQhgyKyA107DBR-/s1600-h/slmap.jpg"><img style="margin: 0px auto 10px; display: block; text-align: center; cursor: pointer;" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjZVpbRzI50hclGIN1nIvxaqnRaFy6OKKfuJyrTjyBKAL4JAce9sU2e6I4JDGbbln5-RciwVNvR1GRS6r4XGB7a8Xb3yZxox2mIwc5CM7XALMyf3ks9F4jkdbZ5n61ezCQhgyKyA107DBR-/s320/slmap.jpg" alt="" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5203062285785714978" border="0" /></a><span style="font-size:78%;">For far too long, capturing Kilinochchi has been a primary goal of the military. Instead, the LTTE's armies, wherever they are at a disadvantage, should themselves be objectives of the Army. </span><span style="font-size:78%;">(Click to Enlarge)</span></p><p class="MsoNormal">For one, many military leaders seem to have a damaging mindset regarding Elephant Pass and Kilinochchi. This mindset has resulted the repeated assaults on the Jaffna Front, each failing just like the one before it. Just as McClellan, Burnside, and a slew of other generals who have not yet been mentioned here led their armies to ruin because of their "On to Richmond!" mentality, Sri Lankan generals seem to have crippled their strategies because of a desire to march on Kilinochchi and recapture Elephant Pass, a symbol of the military's strength up until its capture. These positions should be secondary objectives after a much more important target: the LTTE Army. They should remember that the Confederacy didn't fall because Richmond was taken. Richmond was one of the last cities in The South to fall and had Richmond fallen in 1862, the war would have certainly continued. What finally defeated the Confederacy was a fundamental shift in strategy. The goal to capture Richmond was replaced with an effort to seek out and engage the Confederate Army. When the LTTE’s military has been neutralized, Kilinochchi will take care of itself.</p><p class="MsoNormal">Let the Tigers hold Elephant Pass, and all the rest of the territory between that base and the current trench line. In fact, the longer they hold that position, the longer those soldiers, weapons, and supplies will be denied to the rest of the LTTE. If they remain immobilized because they fear a breakout from Jaffna, they are as good as dead to the soldiers in the South, no even better than dead, since they will continue to consume limited supplies while defending against an attack that should only come if they leave.</p><div style="text-align: center;"><a onblur="try {parent.deselectBloggerImageGracefully();} catch(e) {}" href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjx9DzuQkNlTPkIVSMb2uxU2TKovzaKrR1X7Zsi_yUv7dDzz1azfMedcobylf9rhojUKbYTD7TZDzSgVCHXfNWVCl1Spb6b5X2f1V6lcVOVcQHtXbYI0zJbhXf1gQLiqVzzQr01IQdQOh83/s1600-h/Map+Jaffna.gif"><img style="margin: 0px auto 10px; display: block; text-align: center; cursor: pointer;" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjx9DzuQkNlTPkIVSMb2uxU2TKovzaKrR1X7Zsi_yUv7dDzz1azfMedcobylf9rhojUKbYTD7TZDzSgVCHXfNWVCl1Spb6b5X2f1V6lcVOVcQHtXbYI0zJbhXf1gQLiqVzzQr01IQdQOh83/s320/Map+Jaffna.gif" alt="" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5203061873468854546" border="0" /></a><span style="font-size:78%;">The soldiers on the Jaffna Front are closer to Kilinochchi than any other body of troops, but the heavy rebel defenses makes offensive operations here unwise.<br /></span></div><p class="MsoNormal"><br />It should be fairly obvious that Jaffna is not a preferable route into the Wanni. Its only advantage is its close proximity to the LTTE's capital. This is far outweighed by the defensive strength of the Jaffna Front. The LTTE has thousands of soldiers there, supported by a large number of mines, mortars, artillery and multiple layers of prepared defenses, even tank immobilizing trenches, concentrated in a tiny area. They have had years to find the exact ranges of any position within range of their guns, allowing them to be able to quickly fire, with nearly instant accuracy.<br /><br />There is more LTTE firepower concentrated in this small area than on anywhere else on the island, and they get priority on supplies. On the Southern Fronts, while there are more soldiers, mines, and artillery, it is spread along hundreds of miles of front, and is much thinner than in the North. In Mannar, constant minor shifts in the lines have resulted in inferior defensive structures and a more porous border. Regular skirmishing has also caused many fortifications to be lost, resulting in a lack of proper cover and worse living conditions for the LTTE troops. No course of approach will be easy, but compared to the Jaffna Front, it should be clear that the South is the LTTE's soft underbelly. </p> <p class="MsoNormal"><!--[if !supportEmptyParas]--><!--[endif]--> Given this change in objectives, and a clear understanding that the Wanni should be taken from South to North, the strategic reforms required for victory will have been established. What will remain is the tactical issue of how the advance should be handled. A fear of heavy short-term casualties has resulted in semi-daily minor skirmishing along the Southern Fronts that has gone on since the capture of the Eastern Territories. Winning wars requires decisive action on the part of the aggressor. Since the fall of the East, the military blunders of this war have been made almost exclusively by the Sri Lankan Army, both in its unwillingness to press advantages in the South, and the multiple, inexplicable suicidal assaults on the LTTE’s defenses on the Jaffna Front.</p><p class="MsoNormal"><a onblur="try {parent.deselectBloggerImageGracefully();} catch(e) {}" href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjhyphenhyphen6t70ClstKzS571YMMlnahFEyUQ_YhV1T74rUgaZ_drqxcVF6XDI4kY0IdAg9bIjH3Tl_8jz3iOj-0tdf0nrHoVJFY-0kRYZAQPVz1KY0usA9JfEqtoVZtykoEx2i0k7-HQI6waEVT9B/s1600-h/general_ulysses_grant.sized.jpg"><img style="margin: 0px auto 10px; display: block; text-align: center; cursor: pointer;" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjhyphenhyphen6t70ClstKzS571YMMlnahFEyUQ_YhV1T74rUgaZ_drqxcVF6XDI4kY0IdAg9bIjH3Tl_8jz3iOj-0tdf0nrHoVJFY-0kRYZAQPVz1KY0usA9JfEqtoVZtykoEx2i0k7-HQI6waEVT9B/s320/general_ulysses_grant.sized.jpg" alt="" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5203065472651448626" border="0" /></a> </p> <p style="text-align: center;" class="MsoNormal"><!--[if !supportEmptyParas]--><!--[endif]--> <span style="font-size:78%;">General Ulysses Grant was the Federal commander who ultimately defeated the Confederacy. Accepting some of the heaviest fighting of the war, he used his superior numbers and firepower to its full potential and ended the war. Despite being labeled as a butcher at the time, he ended the war by his actions, while the generals who came before him had lost more men and had nothing to show for it.</span><br /></p><p class="MsoNormal">If the SLA really wants to end this war, they must utilize those factors that make them superior to the LTTE. Their superior numbers allows the SLA to be many places at once, in force. Instead of limiting the army to small skirmishes that gives the LTTE as close to even odds as they'll ever get, Sri Lankan forces should make large scale assaults, accepting the fact that casualties will be higher up front, but also knowing that fewer will die in the long run, as has been discussed in previous articles. Thousands of soldiers should be committed to offensives to break through LTTE lines in the South and force them to fight without prepared defenses further into the Wanni. There should be multiple efforts, carried out along different points along the Southern Fronts, at the same time to prevent the LTTE from shifting troops or weapons from one front to another. </p> <p class="MsoNormal"><!--[if !supportEmptyParas]--><!--[endif]--> The Air Force should also play a major role, but only after they too have undergone a major change in their mission. The Air Force has been squandered by Sri Lanka and has been a bittersweet break for the LTTE. The Air Force should end their hunt for the Air Tiger squadron and abort their bombing of the LTTE airstrip. The rebel planes have no real strategic military value and the war would be better served by SLAF air strikes on enemy FDLs. The massive air defense system that has been developed should also be dismantled. Their resources and personnel are needed elsewhere and even if they are successful and destroy the rebel planes, they will have had as little impact on the outcome of the war as the toy planes they eliminated.</p><p class="MsoNormal"><a onblur="try {parent.deselectBloggerImageGracefully();} catch(e) {}" href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiP2WJJd_lmMScNmnxv4mKemGe8GaZiOl6TDiuV4Pl7gNR3OqGmE9Gc3M5UNzPB77c3fo8lDxZyogCJRochYSpI3Mt7UdDEG7KbOCN_pLKRKJ_6Fvw1ymcjFCFPjj7GiSP8ESfvhuUSZdJ5/s1600-h/thamilchelvan.jpg"><img style="margin: 0px auto 10px; display: block; text-align: center; cursor: pointer;" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiP2WJJd_lmMScNmnxv4mKemGe8GaZiOl6TDiuV4Pl7gNR3OqGmE9Gc3M5UNzPB77c3fo8lDxZyogCJRochYSpI3Mt7UdDEG7KbOCN_pLKRKJ_6Fvw1ymcjFCFPjj7GiSP8ESfvhuUSZdJ5/s320/thamilchelvan.jpg" alt="" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5203071726123831618" border="0" /></a> </p> <p style="text-align: center;" class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:78%;">Decapitation strikes such as the assassination of Thamilchelvan are worthwhile and important services that the SLAF provides, unlike the pointless hunt for the TAF. However, even this valuable job should be secondary to the support of the Army in its campaign to eradicate the LTTE's armies.</span><br /></p><p class="MsoNormal"> The Air Force should also scale back their role as assassins of LTTE political figures. Let the rebel leaders have a couple days off and spend those limited sorties a week on air strikes against fixed LTTE positions along lines of advance. The successful surgical strikes made by the Air Force are what make the current role of the SLAF bitter for the LTTE, but this should still be modified to fit the new objectives of the military as a whole. Transferring the Air Force’s focus to the LTTE Army instead of their political leadership is another aspect of correcting the military’s primary objectives. This does not mean that political targets should no longer be threatened by any air strike, only that they should not take priority except under exceptional circumstances.<br /></p><p class="MsoNormal">The soldiers who charge the LTTE positions on the Jaffna Front are some of the bravest in this war and it is shameful that they have been repeatedly ordered to mount hopeless assaults on impervious enemy fortifications. The massive casualties that have resulted from these many charges should not have occurred, just as the Federals at Fredericksburg should not have been lead to slaughter by the incompetent General Burnside. So too should these brave soldiers not be slowly picked off in years of skirmishing for minimal gain. The McClellan style conservative strategy has likewise caused many needless deaths and threatens the likelihood of victory. Decisive leadership and an intelligent, aggressive, and well-prioritized strategy offers the promise of total victory, and fewer overall casualties. The Sri Lankan leadership should keep this simple wisdom of General Grant in mind when deciding how to conduct the war:<br /></p><p class="MsoNormal">"The art of war is simple enough. Find out where your enemy is. Get at him as soon as you can. Strike him as hard as you can, and keep moving on."</p>E.T. Baileyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14369204396507186919noreply@blogger.com27tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6349712234964693405.post-53222872425852196462008-05-11T20:43:00.000-07:002008-05-21T21:38:19.969-07:00Jaffna and Fredericksburg: Part One<span style="font-family: georgia;" >The Sri Lankan Army took a heavy beating on April 23rd, in the latest of a series of thwarted assaults on the LTTE defenses on the Jaffna Peninsula. Casualties have been difficult to pin down on either side and reports from individuals and groups with military contacts can only give a range of casualties. What is clear is that this was a larger battle than most in recent history and that the LTTE came out on top, while the strategic situation on the Jaffna front has not significantly changed.<br /><br />50-100 Tiger soldiers were killed in the failed attack by elements of the 53 and 55 divisions. As many as 200 have been wounded. The SLA casualties are actually harder to establish, with 100 dead at a minimum, and 185 dead at most. With "inside sources" to back every number in between, it is impossible to know the truth. What is accepted is that roughly 400 Sri Lankan troops have been wounded. No reports have been made on those who may have died of their wounds, on either side, though it is almost certain that some have succumbed to their injuries. Also lost were some Sri Lankan armored vehicles. Like all other figures from the battle, the numbers of damaged or lost vehicles varies from source to source, but including a damaged infantry fighting vehicle from the day prior to the attack, two to eight tanks and IFVs have been damaged or destroyed.<br /><br />Over the years both sides have charged the other's defenses on the Jaffna Front. Most of these attacks have ended in failure for the aggressor, often with heavy loss of life. Since 2001, several SLA attacks have been made, all ending in defeat with hundreds of casualties. It is a situation very similar to the Battle of Fredericksburg in the American Civil War. The Sri Lankan military would do well to learn the history of that battle and the actions of the Union commander, Ambrose Burnside.</span><br /><span style="font-family: georgia;" ><br /></span><div style="text-align: center; font-family: georgia;"><img src="http://i218.photobucket.com/albums/cc195/ExpertTextpert/Ambrose_Everett_Burnside.jpg" align="middle" /><br /></div><span style="font-family: georgia;" ><br /></span><div style="text-align: center; font-family: georgia;"><span style="font-size:78%;">General Ambrose Burnside</span><br /></div><br /><span style="font-family: georgia;" >Following the Confederate's successful escape from McClellan at Sharpsburg, President Lincoln put General Burnside in command of the Union Army. Burnside moved his vastly superior force to the East Bank of the Rappahannock River. On the opposite bank was the town of Fredericksburg, Virginia and the strategically vital Marye's Heights just beyond the town. Burnside planned to quickly cross the river, take the town, and capture the Heights before the Confederates could amass more than a skeleton garrison to defend the area. When Burnside reached the river, only 500 Confederates opposed him across the river, however, Federal troops were unable to take advantage of this numerical superiority, since they could not cross the river without pontoon boats, which had not yet arrived. Burnside refused to formulate a new strategy or objective for his army and opted to wait for the pontoon boats to arrive. It took 25 days for the pontoon boats to finally arrive and be deployed, in which time the better part of the Confederate Army had assembled West of Fredericksburg.<br /><br /></span><div face="georgia" style="text-align: center; font-family: georgia;"><img src="http://i218.photobucket.com/albums/cc195/ExpertTextpert/fredericksburgmap.gif" align="middle" /><br /></div><span style="font-family: georgia;" ><br /><br />General Robert E. Lee ordered General James Longstreet's men to defend Marye's Heights, which made up the Northern half of the battlefield, while General Thomas "Stonewall" Jackson defended the Southern flank made up of fields, shallow creeks, and a rail line. Despite these 72,000 Confederate reinforcements, Burnside still had twice Lee's numbers.<br /></span><br /><span style="font-family: georgia;" ><br /></span><div face="georgia" style="text-align: center; font-family: georgia;"><img src="http://i218.photobucket.com/albums/cc195/ExpertTextpert/BattleofFredericksburgamphibious.jpg" align="middle" /><br /></div><span style="font-family: georgia;" ><br /></span><div face="georgia" style="text-align: center; font-family: georgia;"><span style="font-size:78%;">When the pontoon boats finally arrived, Federal engineers braved sniper fire from Fredericksburg to construct bridges, while Union artillery and an amphibious assault devastated the town to silence the rebel gunmen. Once the bridges were complete, Burnside crossed his army in force.</span><br /></div><span style="font-family: georgia;" ><br />Once across the river, Burnside first attacked Jackson's force. The terrain was open, level, and neither side had permanent positions or fortifications. Burnside initially could use artillery from the opposite side of the river to support his advance, while the Confederates responded with aggressively handled horse artillery. Only two guns dueled the Union batteries for an hour, firing and moving faster than the Federals could react. A tactic the Sri Lankan military is all too familiar with. Union forces began making serious progress by mid morning and continued to push Jackson back until around 1:30. Fortunately for the Confederates, errors in coordination and insufficient numbers allowed Jackson to recover from his setbacks and counterattack, maneuvering between two Federal divisions that had become separated. The Union troops were pushed back and feared being trapped at the riverbank until additional reinforcements finally arrived and halted Jackson's advance. The fighting cost each side around 3,400 casualties. The majority of the Confederate losses for the whole battle occurred here, while the opposite would be true for the Federals.<br /></span><br /><span style="font-family: georgia;" ><br /></span><div face="georgia" style="text-align: center; font-family: georgia;"><img src="http://i218.photobucket.com/albums/cc195/ExpertTextpert/Fredericksburgmap2.jpg" align="middle" /><br /></div><span style="font-family: georgia;" ><br /></span><div style="text-align: center; font-family: georgia;"><span style="font-size:78%;">Troop movements at Fredericksburg</span><br /></div><span style="font-family: georgia;" ><br />Burnside had squandered an opportunity to win the battle and defeat the legendary Jackson. Had the Federals put serious emphasis on Jackson, who had little artillery support, and no dug in positions, and attacked with the bulk of the Union Army, the Confederates would have had no means to hold the line against such a large force. Marye's Heights would have been flanked and Lee would have had to abandon his ideal defensive position or be surrounded. Instead, Burnside shifted his focus to Longstreet's dug in soldiers on the Heights.<br /><br />Longstreet had the bulk of the Rebel artillery supporting his troops and had his infantry amassed along a sunken dirt road with a stone wall along one side. The result was a natural trench that gave excellent cover to his men while still allowing them a full range of fire. His concentration of force made any attempt to dislodge him an act of suicide. It seemed that everyone understood this, except Burnside. Confederate artillerist Edward Alexander<br />bragged to Longstreet that, "not even a chicken could live in that field when we open upon it."<br /></span><br /><span style="font-family: georgia;" ><br /></span><br /><div style="text-align: center; font-family: georgia;"><span style="font-size:78%;"><img src="http://i218.photobucket.com/albums/cc195/ExpertTextpert/Raise_Follow_Me.jpg" align="middle" /></span><br /></div><br /><div style="text-align: center; font-family: georgia;"><span style="font-size:78%;">The famous charge of the Irish Brigade</span><br /></div><span style="font-family: georgia;" ><br />Burnside Dedicated six divisions to taking the Heights, charging the Rebel position 16 times, usually in one-brigade charges. Although Longstreet was outnumbered, he held the high ground, was supported by artillery, and was well dug in. Each charge was easily repulsed with serious Union losses. It is here that the famous charge of the Irish Brigade was made. Advancing to within 50 feet of the stone wall, the 1,600 men of that fateful unit were cut to pieces by Confederate Irish troops of the Georgian Legion and only 256 men managed to escape. This courageous, but futile assault is made famous in the movie "Gods and Generals."<br /></span><br /><br /><span style="font-family: georgia;" ><br /><object height="355" width="425"><param name="movie" value="http://www.youtube.com/v/7qVCxEupPag&hl=en"><param name="wmode" value="transparent"><embed src="http://www.youtube.com/v/7qVCxEupPag&hl=en" type="application/x-shockwave-flash" wmode="transparent" height="355" width="425"></embed></object><br /></span><div style="text-align: center; font-family: georgia;"><span style="font-size:78%;">Watching the carnage, General Lee commented, "it is well that war is so terrible, or we should grow too fond of it."</span><br /></div><br /><span style="font-family: georgia;font-family:georgia;" >1,200 Confederates were killed or wounded defending Marye's Heights. Over 10,000 Federals fell trying to dislodge them. It was one of the most one-sided victories of the war. Burnside had bungled the entire campaign, but the final cause of his defeat wasn't his inaction before the battle. It was his refusal to concentrate his forces where Lee was weakest and instead threw his army against the most secure piece of real estate in the Confederacy.</span><br /><br /><span style="font-family: georgia;font-family:georgia;" >Sri Lanka would do well to remember Fredericksburg. The SLA needs to launch a major offensive, no doubt, but the location of such an offensive is as important as the action itself. Just as Burnside had a choice between Marye's Heights and the open terrain to the South of the battlefield, the Sri Lankan military has a choice between the bottleneck of the Jaffna Front, and the wide-open Southern Fronts.</span><br /></span>E.T. Baileyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14369204396507186919noreply@blogger.com3tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6349712234964693405.post-58818518284513006422008-04-18T16:45:00.000-07:002008-04-18T23:08:27.810-07:00Repititions of History, the American and Sri Lankan Civil Wars<span style="color:black;">It is a difficult thing to see the suffering of war, even if it does not compare to the hardships of those actually living through it. What’s worse though is knowing how peace can be restored and seeing those in power making the mistakes of others in history. Nearly 150 years ago, Northingtons, Nowlins, Simmonses, Harrises, Baileys, and a score more families whose descendent now writes this article fought, killed, suffered and died across the American South. While most of these families fought for the </span><span style="color:black;">Confederacy, the lesson of history that this article seeks to recall is a failure of a Union general early in the War Between the States. All should remember it and the cost of the many years of war that followed, but, more so than any other, the people of Sri Lanka need this lesson because this same mistake has been made in their civil war and will cost them far more sons and daughters than should have been required.</span><div style="text-align: left;"><div style="text-align: center;"><a onblur="try {parent.deselectBloggerImageGracefully();} catch(e) {}" href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhyrlPHynkuNEkDuxl2bohZieb4iDkQff7kLcvLJVrn1DbjSiPZKlUqv5GbdPe4J9NGmr3pGUmigwwQYrk_Km6R8fLt_Ytg1gBmgDkTXEjxj2X_eQC9JEgO9WeZySsw-vJekznOYeWwmfwR/s1600-h/mclell.jpg"><img style="margin: 0px auto 10px; display: block; text-align: center; cursor: pointer;" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhyrlPHynkuNEkDuxl2bohZieb4iDkQff7kLcvLJVrn1DbjSiPZKlUqv5GbdPe4J9NGmr3pGUmigwwQYrk_Km6R8fLt_Ytg1gBmgDkTXEjxj2X_eQC9JEgO9WeZySsw-vJekznOYeWwmfwR/s320/mclell.jpg" alt="" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5190752781403966514" border="0" /></a><span style="font-size:78%;">General George B. McClellan<br /><br /></span></div><span style="color:black;"> In mid March of 1862, General George B. McClellan launched an amphibious assault on the Virginia Peninsula and soon had nearly 400 ships and over 120,000 troops under his command. The landing had bypassed the Confederate Army that guarded the capitol of Richmond from an invasion out of Maryland, and so only 13,000 Rebels opposed th</span><span style="color:black;">is massive force. Despite his total superiority in numbers, the cautious Union general ordered that the 13,000 Confederates be taken by siege. Despite being hugely outnumbered, this small force of Confederates occupied the entire Union Army for a month, finally retreating on May 4<sup>th</sup>. While twice as many Rebels had died as Federals, they had bought precious time for the Confederacy to formulate a capable response to the invasion. For the rest of May the Union advan</span><span style="color:black;">ced slowly, taking their time.</span><span style="color:black;"> When McClellan finally reached Richmond, stiff resistance by </span><span style="color:black;">a</span><span style="color:black;"> still totally inferior force convinced him to repeat his siege tactics, buildin</span><span style="color:black;">g a second Forward Defensive Line (FDL) and calling for reinforcements. Edward M.</span><span style="color:black;"> Stanton noted McClellan’s overly cautious attitude and tendency to overestimate the strength of his enemy by saying, “If he had a million men he would swear the enemy had two millions, </span><span style="color:black;">and then he would sit in the mud and yell for three!”<br /></span></div> <p class="ecmsonormal" style="text-indent: 0.5in; text-align: center;"><a onblur="try {parent.deselectBloggerImageGracefully();} catch(e) {}" href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhR1bfig6NL3aRYyy6HzaYL5GdxZ1a4h0D0Nq3kSD3NzbCUpUAOkGVm2i22adt_ah8rkn73DrcFNHNqRM4_34d0xV9kU-CLRRjyu8dUF1PuvCfL3l_HKpMdUlQ31i6I-iVncH8Jhgt1dE4W/s1600-h/PeninsulaCampaign.png"><img style="margin: 0px auto 10px; display: block; text-align: center; cursor: pointer;" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhR1bfig6NL3aRYyy6HzaYL5GdxZ1a4h0D0Nq3kSD3NzbCUpUAOkGVm2i22adt_ah8rkn73DrcFNHNqRM4_34d0xV9kU-CLRRjyu8dUF1PuvCfL3l_HKpMdUlQ31i6I-iVncH8Jhgt1dE4W/s320/PeninsulaCampaign.png" alt="" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5190748434897062946" border="0" /></a><span style="font-size:78%;">The Peninsula Campaign (Click to Enlarge)</span><span style="font-size:78%;"><br /></span></p><div style="text-align: center;"><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="color:black;"> This cost McClellan the campaign when Confederate counterattacks, forced him to withdrawal, despite suffering greater losses and still never coming close to the size McClellan’s force. Months later, in Maryland, McClellan’s caution prevented him from destroying a retreating Rebel Army that could have ended the war as well. The nation was torn apart by the war that lasted until 1865 because of these shortcomings. It also cost around half a million more lives. </span><br /></div></div><br /><div style="text-align: center;"><div style="text-align: left;"><a onblur="try {parent.deselectBloggerImageGracefully();} catch(e) {}" href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEib5-7ZTF1vXAUsGx6jApuxE2Ogqt8SGc43-FYszHVzFA0egwRtM6exuxZh8zQ1-98s8A3tvOdyHAVFelnLUY9PR2XSbmflIscBCk4gcaxu1ObDY2t563vO_Cxghxxdd3EpboptFl7js3NX/s1600-h/fonseka.jpg"><img style="margin: 0px auto 10px; display: block; text-align: center; cursor: pointer;" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEib5-7ZTF1vXAUsGx6jApuxE2Ogqt8SGc43-FYszHVzFA0egwRtM6exuxZh8zQ1-98s8A3tvOdyHAVFelnLUY9PR2XSbmflIscBCk4gcaxu1ObDY2t563vO_Cxghxxdd3EpboptFl7js3NX/s320/fonseka.jpg" alt="" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5190754800038595650" border="0" /></a></div><span style="font-size:78%;">Lt. General Sarath Fonseka<br /><br /></span></div> <span style="color:black;"> Sri Lanka is now suffering its own Peninsular Campaign. General Sarath Fonseka was looking at the end of the war last August. The East had been totally liberated and the Navy was in the process of wiping out the last of the LTTE’s large blockade running ships. The Tigers had once controlled Jaffna, most of the East Coast, and territory in the West far South of Mannar. The entire Northern part of the island was a rebel stronghold, and to defend it all, tens of thousands of people were put under arms, a brown water navy was created and so</span><span style="color:black;">on became world famous, and an air force would be born with an air strike on the Sri Lankan capital. However, by last August, the Tamil Tigers were facing supply shortages because of the loss of so many blockade runners, Jaffna had long fallen, territory south of Ma</span><span style="color:black;">nnar was lost or falling, and the whole of the East Coast had been overrun. General Fonseka chose to besiege</span><span style="color:black;"> th</span><span style="color:black;">e Tigers now. While the Sri Lankan Army recruited and consolidated their forces, daily skirmishes were fought along the entire border of the Tiger held “Wanni.”<br /></span><a onblur="try {parent.deselectBloggerImageGracefully();} catch(e) {}" href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgIQViThp8p-U5zHv7Gd3a7DyFZrYvD6O3olszzwqmDmbrnDp5CWsmkaSlaQ5UYd60UE-uFk1g37qqXco_nui7Slp7qnjhAaINB_F_yHD9vuK1V0FkXh0FAdfsEMGFHSAej8AN1HqdnAbg1/s1600-h/180px-Mannar_district.svg.png"><img style="margin: 0px auto 10px; display: block; text-align: center; cursor: pointer;" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgIQViThp8p-U5zHv7Gd3a7DyFZrYvD6O3olszzwqmDmbrnDp5CWsmkaSlaQ5UYd60UE-uFk1g37qqXco_nui7Slp7qnjhAaINB_F_yHD9vuK1V0FkXh0FAdfsEMGFHSAej8AN1HqdnAbg1/s320/180px-Mannar_district.svg.png" alt="" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5190826719265967218" border="0" /></a><div style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size:78%;">The Sri Lankan Civil War's heaviest fighting is currently centered around Mannar District<br /><br /></span></div><span style="color:black;"> There was merit in Fonseka’s decision. The enemy was still full of fight, and supply shortages were getting worse for the Tigers as time went on. Fonseka also had to commit troops to recently liberated territory to ensure it remained so, and to defend strategic areas from an LTTE offensive. Only after five months of waiting and minor fighting did Fonseka finally declare the final offensive to end the war. True to his and McClellan’s cautious strategic nature, the offensive failed to materialize in any form except a painfully slow crawl around Mannar. Plans to push into the Wanni through the East Coast were seemingly abandoned as minor skirmishing continues to be the only action there.<br /></span><br /><div style="text-align: center;"><a onblur="try {parent.deselectBloggerImageGracefully();} catch(e) {}" href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjJAxgAb9PenhV-bzKfXD1B1QAh2xGbw5xGBm8Q98XpcQqN6XRLDG8-fjud4RdpLbZDiv1Vp1Pxci_VLfUOeZ-nr-xIrtJlx3UFlp9hF1wRzf3M_ZeHtxyaZP5bIYVEse4yMzarVWj6CqmZ/s1600-h/633.ht7.jpg"><img style="margin: 0px auto 10px; display: block; text-align: center; cursor: pointer;" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjJAxgAb9PenhV-bzKfXD1B1QAh2xGbw5xGBm8Q98XpcQqN6XRLDG8-fjud4RdpLbZDiv1Vp1Pxci_VLfUOeZ-nr-xIrtJlx3UFlp9hF1wRzf3M_ZeHtxyaZP5bIYVEse4yMzarVWj6CqmZ/s320/633.ht7.jpg" alt="" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5190828962794115538" border="0" /></a><span style="font-size:78%;">Plans to launch a major offensive on the East Coast along the Weli Oya front, which is defined by the Manal River, has never escalated past minor skirmishes.<br /><br /></span></div><a href="http://defencenet.blogspot.com/2007/03/madhu-offensive-temporarily-halted-due.html">http://defencenet.blogspot.com/2007/03/madhu-offensive-temporarily-halted-due.html</a> <span style="color:black;"><o:p></o:p><br /></span><span style="color:black;"><br />This article from the Sri Lankan military blog “DefenceNet” shows this lack of progress as clearly as could ever be done.<span style=""> </span>An article from March 25<sup>th</sup> of last year discusses LTTE forces successfully defending the same church that is being fought for today.<span style=""> </span>Thirteen months later, this Church remains in Tiger hands, and the only sign of progress is the inching forward of Sri Lankan soldiers that gives some hope that the Church will be free of separatists before the fourteenth month is out.<span style=""> </span>A soldier can likely see from his frontline position today</span><span style="color:black;">, all the places he has been for the past year, and he wouldn’t need binoculars.<span style=""> </span>The church and a small town called Adampan, desired only because it is at a crossroad between two highways forced into disuse by war, have been the objectives of the Army since before the fall of the East and the likelihood of either of them falling by the end of the month is about as good as they were last April.</span><span style="color:black;"><br /><br />The price of this refusal to commit to a major offensive has been heavy.<span style=""> </span>It has been nearly as heavy, actually probably more so, than the cost of a major battle would have been. While the LTTE were facing critical ammunition shortages in the end months of 2007, resupplies from India using smaller ships have bolstered the LTTE armories</span><span style="color:black;">. The loss in soldiers is more difficult to determine, but nearly 300 Sri Lankan soldiers and police have died since the would-be offensive began in January. Adding those dead to at least 500 (probably more) soldiers, militia, and police who died since last August, a minimum of 800 people have died on the side of Sri Lanka in this intentional stalemate. Because of the difficulty in determining casualties, it is possible that the death toll for Sri Lankans under arms exceeds 1,000 by this point.<span style=""> </span>LTTE losses are also hard to determine, but are probably in the rage of 4,000-5,000. Ironically, most of those dead were drafted to participate in these very skirmishes and the loss of the weapons they carried have been as great a hurt to the Tigers as the loss of their lives. The real strategic damage caused to the LTTE in this time of attrition is actually likely to be in the same range as the losses of Sri Lanka.</span><span style="color:black;"><br /></span><br /><span style="color:black;">Fonseka’s lack of action gave the LTTE time to find new methods to smuggle supplies into their territory, negating last year’s victories by the Sri Lankan Navy. This failure to act also allowed the LTTE time to prepare stronger defenses, train m</span><span style="color:black;">ore fighters, including some more hardcore fighters, and whittle away at the Sri Lankan Air Force and Navy with suicide missions and by mining coastal waters.</span><span style="color:black;"><br /><br />Even worse is that General Fonseka declared that the Wanni would fall by the end of the year. At the time, this was actually quite possible. The Tigers were at their low water mark when the general made this bold promise. Unfortunately, Fonseka has refused to push a major offensive. His numbers, technology, supplies, morale, and training all greatly exceeds that of the LTTE, and he can strike literally anywhere he desires. His refusal to use these advantages is ensuring a longer, more costly war against a better-prepared enemy. More Sri Lankans will die in this creeping advance against an enemy that always is given t</span><span style="color:black;">ime to recover, regroup, and rearm. The failure to end this war by the end of the year will hurt public opinion on the war and in the worst-case scenario, will force an unfavorable end to the conflict. More likely though is that the war will be won, but only after years of continued fighting and great loss of life that could have so easily been avoided.</span><span style="color:black;"><br /><br />General Fonseka has served his country with distinction. His tactical successes are legendary and many soldiers owe him their lives. For the Midnight Express alone, Sri Lanka owes him a debt of gratitude. He has also been a great reformer, leading the way in making the Army a larger, more capable, better-trained force. Just Like McClellan, he is perhaps best suited for training an army more so than for using one.<span style=""> </span>It is little wonder that these men were so unwilling to enter a fight that would force a portion their masterpieces to be sacrificed. </span><span style="color:black;"><br /><br />Fonseka was also in charge during the Liberation of the East, though the effect of the Karuna defection was a great boon to his efforts. Still, his current inaction is hurting the nation and armies exist to serve their countries. Fonseka’s unwillingness to launch a real Northern Offensive and instance on making excuses for delay is now a detriment to Sri Lanka. He should either be made to act or replaced if he refuses.</span><span style="color:black;"><br /><br /></span><div style="text-align: center;"><a onblur="try {parent.deselectBloggerImageGracefully();} catch(e) {}" href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg5arlacV8Cuhrl_cv2RaVRQEhGbk5ZykgwF5GdY17jqmNUUVMJlbYd1jSLInUeVDjszVdkBa6ZKRfM98uCBdKfrJ0CH6DmRSq4KOx9mmXOgDBreCZqLX-DLwugzlBk2bu2sIsrxJSC7FG_/s1600-h/abraham-lincoln-antietam.jpg"><img style="margin: 0px auto 10px; display: block; text-align: center; cursor: pointer;" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg5arlacV8Cuhrl_cv2RaVRQEhGbk5ZykgwF5GdY17jqmNUUVMJlbYd1jSLInUeVDjszVdkBa6ZKRfM98uCBdKfrJ0CH6DmRSq4KOx9mmXOgDBreCZqLX-DLwugzlBk2bu2sIsrxJSC7FG_/s320/abraham-lincoln-antietam.jpg" alt="" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5190832321458541026" border="0" /></a><span style="font-size:78%;">President Lincoln meeting with General McClellan after the battle of Sharpsburg (Antietam)<br /><br /></span></div><span style="color:black;">When McClellan let the Confederate Army escape from Maryland, President Lincoln traveled to meet with him. After much urging, the general still insisted on inaction. The president relieved him of his command with a famous line that the people of Sri Lanka should repeat to General Fonseka.<br /></span> <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color:black;"> “If you are not using the Army, I should like to borrow it for a while."</span></p>E.T. Baileyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14369204396507186919noreply@blogger.com5tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6349712234964693405.post-4883664090778832702008-03-13T23:49:00.000-07:002008-03-14T16:03:04.700-07:00Sibley's Brigade in the Red River Campaign, Part One: Overview of the Campaign<div align="left">In the final months of the American Civil War, Federal troops launched an ambitious campaign to take control of the Red River, capture the Confederate Army's Trans-Mississippi Department's headquarters at Shreveport, Louisiana, and occupy East Texas. 50,000 men launched the Red River Campaign with expectations of an easy victory, but after early successes, the reality would be just the opposite. The Confederate military proved that it still had plenty of fight left in it and routed Lincoln's men. The stunning success of the Confederates in this campaign could not turn the tide of the war, but the Southern Cause survived for several more months because of this victory. It further ensured that Texas would be the only state in the Confederacy without a large Federal force operating within her borders by the end of the war.<br /><br />Throughout the campaign, the Texas Sibley Brigade (aka the Bagby Brigade) distinguished itself by fighting in both conventional battles and successfully engaging in modern partisan warfare against the Union naval task force (the Red River Squadron) that took part in the Campaign. Their success made them, arguably, the most effective Confederate force in the campaign, but their story has been largely forgotten. They are unsung Texas heroes who have inspired a series of articles to bring their deeds to light and ensure that they will be remembered in the future. However, before their story can be told, the circumstances surrounding the brigade things need to be understood. More specifically, an overview of the Red River Campaign, the Red River Squadron, and a history of the Sibley Brigade will be discussed. These subjects are far too large to be combined into a single article, so each will be discussed separately, starting with an overview of the Red River Campaign. </div><div align="left"><br /><br /></div><p><img id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5177486339245332018" style="margin: 0px auto 10px; display: block; text-align: center;" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEilLXfuWAQbB8D6NfBmrgY7fltIoxQiJI7etoXePvl3P-ekKPAz_O2Mmr1MQvFtgpI1NjhBKPVZQY3rq_s13CNbBgWv9kTlRYwvlAdYV3PkZrluxIH1GTlNmJf2CzxsjEvhXpTaSLYG4TQe/s320/map.jpg" border="0" /><br />The Red River Campaign was waged by Federal units taken from all sectors of the Trans-Mississippi Front. The Red River squadron took the bulk of the Union Navy's muscle on the Mississippi, while the land contingent was made up mainly of General Nathaniel Banks' 15,000 man strong Army of the Gulf. An additional 10,000 troops were siphoned from General Sherman's army in Vicksburg, 15,000 troops under General Fredrick Steele were taken from Little Rock, and a brigade each of Marines and colored troops were combined to form 45,000 armed effectives. Supporting this army was the newly formed Red River Squadron, made up of over 50 ships. The crews of these ships, combined with the ground forces, added up to nearly 50,000 soldiers, sailors, and Marines.<br /><br />The Campaign was the plan of General-in-Chief Henry Halleck and was led by General Banks, who selected General William Franklin to replace him as commander of the Army of the Gulf. Admiral David Porter commanded the Red River Squadron. Halleck's strategy called for two Federal troop bodies. The first would include 30,000 troops, plus Porter's fleet, and would advance straight up the Red River towards Shreveport, while 15,000 men under Steele would move South from Arkansas and meet up with the first group at Shreveport. Steele would then provide an occupying force while the rest of the Union task force would move into East Texas. </p><p><br /><img id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5177486399374874178" style="margin: 0px auto 10px; display: block; text-align: center;" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg5MxMLwH3nf2rKETityGtIPMtEupU2OFe8d_7e0g7uHwW3Jnr4kYV0wb1xHQ8tKka-8mY2Rk196Acpbh5A1sOu76RPSLpYTqkvBRfCy-vSWR1gyHSmWYxUR-oUJ3GtKnH6mbgY96Nw2ZgD/s320/russy.jpg" border="0" /></p><p align="center"><span style="font-size:78%;">Fort De Russy</span> </p><p align="left">On March 14th, 1864, the troops granted to Banks from Sherman, under command of General A.J. Smith, fought the first major battle of the campaign with a surprise attack on Fort De Russy. The battle was much lighter than either side had anticipated, with only two Confederate fatalities, and less than fifty Union dead. Still, over 300 rebels were taken prisoner, and the only heavy artillery the Confederates had in the region were captured. This was the only obstruction preventing Union access to the Red River and the loss of the fort's garrison meant that no other rebel force existed that was large enough to attempt to stand and fight. River obstacles had been placed to block Porter's ships, but these were removed in a day once the fort had been neutralized.<br /><br />Commanding the Confederate troops in the region was General Kirby Smith, who was in charge of the Trans-Mississippi Department. He was the direct superior of Richard Taylor, the son of former president Zachary Taylor, who actually led the rebel defense. Both Smith and General Magruder, of the East Texas Department, sent troops to reinforce Taylor, however, Texas troops were slow to arrive. Smith offered only 4,000 troops to meet Taylor at Shreveport, far from where they were actually needed. With only 7,000 men actually at his disposal, Taylor was forced to abandon Alexandria and retreat towards Shreveport. Despite orders to allow Federal forces to advance deep into Louisiana before counter-attacking, Taylor resolved to stand and fight as soon as he could gather a more sizable force.<br /><br />Smith captured Alexandria on the 17th, and was met by Banks on the 24th. However, Banks was traveling separately from the main body of troops who didn't arrive for another day. From the 21st on, minor cavalry skirmishes were the only resistance offered by the rebels. Taylor continued to retreat towards Shreveport until he met up with the lead elements of the Texas reinforcements on April 6th. From his camp on Pleasant Hill he redirected most Texas units North to Mansfield, however, elements of several Texas brigades, including the bulk of the Sibley Brigade, heavily engaged Union cavalry on April 7th at Crump's Corner near Pleasant Hill. While the skirmish was inconclusive, it signaled two things. It told the Federals that the Confederate resistance was stiffening and that heavier fighting was sure to follow, while also marking the beginning of the Sibley Brigade's involvement in the campaign. General Franklin did not believe that the Confederates would stand and fight, and when Taylor abandoned Pleasant Hill on the 6th, Banks was likewise convinced. </p><div align="left"><br /></div><img id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5177487159584085602" style="margin: 0px auto 10px; display: block; text-align: center;" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhPpSUC6Db1dJ51bPpqMEYy3di7gtxcOuLLJcWt9QCBGo6X0H-GxMLHTVO7M0gL7JtANWsR8etuQ4C7Z804_2P8NxwZl02JrXYxm9quS3NMnVIhyDmGC9qy5mW14fgw1zPXhNRN3LmWXD5B/s320/pleasant-hill.jpg" border="0" /> <p align="center"><span style="font-size:78%;">The Battle of Pleasant Hill was not the total victory that Mansfield had been, but it still resulted in Banks abandoning the field after heavy fighting, and ended any hope for success in the Red River Campaign. </span><br /></p><div align="left"><br />With Texas reinforcements now under Taylor's command, he had a total force of less than 10,000 men. Cavalry skirmishes continued until the 8th, when Taylor made a stand with 8,800 of his men at Mansfield, only 25 miles from the Texas border. Back and forth skirmishing was replaced that afternoon with a major Confederate charge that broke the Union line and overran their wagon train, along with 20 artillery pieces. By the end of the day, some 3,000 Federal soldiers were dead, wounded, captured, or missing, while only around 1,000 Confederate casualties were suffered. It was a stunning military success by an outnumbered but daring rebel force. Taylor quickly moved to press his victory and struck Banks the next day at Pleasant Hill. Here the Federals held, but retreated the next day, leaving their dead on the field. Each side suffered some 1,600 casualties. Banks abandoned the campaign at this point and retreated to the Mississippi River.<br /><br />Meanwhile, General Steele's 7,000 men had been advancing south and had fought several skirmishes, but due to critical supply shortages and after losing nearly 2,000 men in the Battles of Poison Spring and Marks' Mills, he quit the campaign and retreated to Little Rock. However, he still played a critical role in the campaign when General Smith ordered half of Taylor's troops to move north to face Steele's men. This decision may have helped crush Steele's task force, but it had weakened Taylor's main force when it had Banks on the run. As a result, Banks was able to escape, and fight off Confederate efforts to destroy his rearguard.<br /><br />Both union battle groups would fight successful rearguard actions on land, but the haste of Banks' retreat without proper communication to Admiral Porter, resulted in many ships being isolated on the Red River which became vulnerable to enemy action. This will be the subject of later articles.<br /><br />In all, General Taylor drove Union forces out of the Red River area, thanks largely to reinforcements from Texas. It would be the last great Southern victory of the war, but because of Kirby Smith's decision to split Taylor's forces after Pleasant Hill, the victory could not be completed. Some wonder if the destruction of Banks' army and the destruction or capture of Porter's fleet as a result, might have changed the course of the war. This is almost certainly not the case, but it could have added as much as a year of life to the Confederacy. </div>E.T. Baileyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14369204396507186919noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6349712234964693405.post-37229214957759629252008-03-09T21:39:00.000-07:002008-03-14T00:21:47.824-07:00The Logic of Attrition Warfare in the Sri Lankan Civil WarThe Sri Lankan public's unwillingness to back a large scale engagement on account of the heavier losses any such battle is expected to result in greatly hampers their military's capacity to defeat the LTTE. A major offensive needs to begin as quickly as possible and the citizens of Sri Lanka need to reconsider their situation. This offensive would, naturally, include the mine clearing tactics that was talked about in the previous article.<br /><br />It is almost certain that fewer Sri Lankan soldiers will die in the long run if the LTTE is destroyed sooner rather than later. The public needs to come to terms with the fact that casualties are going to increase when this offensive finally occurs, but it is a blessing in disguise. It is generally true that more soldiers die in larger battles in the short term but over time, constant low intensity fighting surpasses the cost of a major battle. To see if this is true, lets consider the losses suffered on each side in this intentional stalemate.<br /><br />Since, lets say, August of 2007, a few thousand LTTE fighters, most of them conscripts, and many of them drafted after our stated start date, have died in operations in and around the Wanni. No LTTE provoked major battle has ever resulted in so many dead. For the Sri Lankan military, casualty reports that are older than January 1st are difficult to come by, but based various reports of different engagements during this time period, at least 500 Sri Lankan soldiers, police, and Home Guard have been killed. The true death toll is probably much higher, and thousands have been wounded since last August. This would rank among the most costly battles of the war for the Sri Lankan military if it had been paid for up front. The kill ratio for these past many months may be mathematically favorable to Sri Lanka, but the benefits won are no longer worth the time, resources, or lives. They were at one point, but that time has past.<br /><br />Many people haven't really understood that there is a price to pay in a meat grinder strategy. Military propaganda articles often report their claimed total LTTE deaths over a long period of time while, whenever military deaths are mentioned, only the most recent casualties are talked about, with the exception of the resent report on 2008 casualties. While propaganda can't be soley blamed for the mindset of the Sri Lankan people, many are guilty of looking at these two complementary facts through two different contexts. This gives a false impression that the military is not sacrificing in this campaign, when in reality Sri Lanka continues to pay a heavy price for what is now unclear benefit.<br /><br />The logic that a favorable kill ratio number is equal to a favorable trade in lives is also questionable. The claim that the body count system is depleting the Wanni's population at anywhere close to a rate that can be of use to this campaign is almost certainly false, and that will be addressed shortly. For now it is enough just to know that it is in question. Given this, what logic is there in trading the lives of soldiers, at any ratio, for the lives of conscripts who were only drafted as a result of the attrition strategy being used to kill them? It is a mathematical fact that the shorter a war is, the fewer people can be drafted into it, so the longer the SLA fights a war of attrition, the more children and other draftees they will have to kill and die trying to kill. In another reality where the SLA took the initiative, many LTTE draftees that are already dead now might have never been drafted in the first place.<br /><br />This strategy's continued use is no longer beneficial to the overall campaign by itself. It had many beneficial results in the past, but is no longer worth using, unless it is used in conjunction with a major offensive. It has hurt enemy morale, while boosting that of the Sri Lankan military. It has made the LTTE defensive lines chaotic and porous, while the deaths of volunteers and veterans among the LTTE are always positive bonuses. However, the logic of bleeding the Wanni's military age population by killing draftees doesn't seem to work unless the Sri lankan military abandons its hope to capture the Wanni by the end of 2008. In this line of thinking, no one seems to consider the Wanni's birth rate since, say, 1980. It is quite probable that the birth rate is greater than 10 births a day, which is the average number of LTTE soldiers killed each day. Assuming that this is not the case, whatever birth rate has been the case since the war began will be enough to keep the LTTE well stocked with conscripts for years. This is a race against the clock and the longer the SLA spends bleeding off draftees that can and are being easily replaced, the more likely it is that political, economic, or international factors will rescue the LTTE and keep this war going for many years to come.<br /><br />This attrition is unlikely to be achieving its goal of depleting the LTTE's supply of war materials. If anything, the LTTE is slowly increasing their stocks over time. Shortly after the last big blockade runner had been sunk, they were dealing with material shortfalls that were seen in artillery rationing on their part, but that is long over and artillery duels are pretty common now. Using many smaller craft, the LTTE seems to be enjoying a constant influx of supplies from Tamil Nadu and since the SLA is not inclined to push a major offensive, the LTTE has been able to stockpile munitions, giving them an advantage they should never have had.<br /><br />The reality of the price being paid by both sides, the high probability of improving LTTE supply stocks, the fact that the objectives that have been met by this attrition strategy were met a long time ago, and the uncertainty about the strategy's success in depleting the Wanni's manpower pool to any significant degree, leads to the conclusion that this strategy is no longer providing benefit to Sri Lanka and should be replaced or coupled with a more aggressive strategy to bring about real tangible progress in concluding this war.<br /><br />A crtical benefit of a major offensive that attrition does not offer is that it will result in larger battles that will quickly change the strategic situation in the areas where they are fought. In a matter of a few short days, a major engagement can achieve more than months of raids and counter raids. An offensive, if executed with a level of competency expected from the greatly improved Sri Lankan military, will be able to strike the LTTE hard enough to significantly shorten the war.<br /><br />The Wanni is not a single, massive, formation of bunkers and trenches and a problem faced by soldiers today is that even if they do capture a bunker line, by the time they are allowed to advance again, new fortifications have been built behind what was previously the Tiger's fall back line. New mine fields are also often planted. This crawling advance ensures that the LTTE will always be well dug in and will have prepared defensive positions to retreat to. A major offensive can break both the LTTE's primary and secondary Forward Defensive Lines, or FDLs, and force them to do one of three things, while eliminating the problem of prepared enemy positions. All three of these options would be major successes for Sri Lanka by themselves, but the potential results are even more valuable.<br /><br />The Tigers can abandon the area, leaving only saboteurs, which while they are problematic, are better than hundreds of dug in Tigers with artillery. They can also decide to counter attack, which would be a gift from God for the SLA, allowing them to use their superior numbers and firepower to butcher the LTTE. The casualties suffered by the LTTE in such a counter attack would cripple their capacity to resist the SLA in the sector in contest, allowing for a rapid advance. Finally, the Tigers may choose to try and contain the breakthrough by standing and defending a suddenly difficult to define front line, from unprepared defenses, without artillery support, or at least with a reduced artillery capacity. Getting the LTTE to stand and fight from a disadvantage, whether they are defending against an SLA attack, or counter attacking, would allow the military to greatly reduce the Tiger population in the area of operations.<br /><br />There is a general fear among the citizens of Sri Lanka that the LTTE will win a crucial victory if a major battle is fought. This is unlikely to occur, since the factors that allowed the LTTE to win battles in the past have greatly changed. An army that is afraid to fight is ultimately self-defeating and this war will not end without multiple major battles. The sooner these are fought, the sooner the war can be won. The superior numbers, technology, production capacity, and leadership of the Sri Lankan military means that the Tigers will not be able to win battles the way they did in the past. If the Sri Lankan military is truly committed to a battle, then they cannot be defeated. Fears of a repeat of the debacles of Elephant Pass and Mullativu are based on a misunderstanding of the LTTE's strength and fuel a fear of larger battles in the minds of Sri Lankan citizens. While they are a fierce enemy that can cause grievous injury to the military, it was the cutting of supply lines to the Elephant Pass Base and the Mullaitivu relief force that were the killing blows for these battles, not brute force. General Fonseka should concentrate his conservative strategic nature on securing supply lines once a major push is made, not in killing time in the meat grinder of trench warfare. The LTTE's desire to cut these lines, be they by land, or by sea as a result of an amphibious landing, could actually give Sri Lanka the major battle they need. Concentration of force and commitment by the SLA and SLN can turn this weak point into an opportunity to strike a major blow against the LTTE. With Fonseka's conservative style guiding the offensive, the LTTE would be hard pressed to cut off advancing troops for any significant period of time and so long as Sri Lanka maintains superior numbers and firepower, the Tigers will have no way to stop the SLA from marching anywhere in the Wanni.<br /><br />This offensive must begin soon though because Sri Lanka's economy cannot sustain the war effort forever, while public opinion can easily turn against the government if clear progress is not made. Sri lanka's dependence on international support, or at least neutrality also limits the time they have to end this war. Concerns about the hardships suffered by civilians in this war may cause nations that supply the Sri Lankan military to end their support, which may very well ensure the LTTE's survival for years to come.E.T. Baileyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14369204396507186919noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6349712234964693405.post-67424412319854192442008-03-09T15:04:00.000-07:002008-03-14T00:20:08.040-07:00Breaking through Minefields in the Sri Lankan Civil WarThe Sri Lankan Civil War has been raging for decades with tens of thousands of people killed on each side. Ethnic Tamil separatists have been fighting for a racially exclusive country in the North and East of the island. Developments since 2004 have seen the Liberation Ligers of Tamil Eelam, or LTTE lose almost all of their territory in the East of the island, while minor losses have been suffered on the Western coast as well. Splits within the rebel organization and a modernized Sri Lankan military has pushed the LTTE to the brink of destruction and what could be the final stage of the war is on the horizon. The remaining LTTE forces have been surrounded in the Northern part of Sri Lanka, called the Wanni. This region includes the rebellion's capital city of Kilinochchi and is defended on several fronts by long lines of trenches, bunkers, and minefields. Commander of the Sri Lankan Army, Lt. General Sarath Fonseka, has sworn to take control of the Wanni by the end of 2008, and fierce trench warfare has resulted in tremendous losses on both sides.<br /><br /><div style="TEXT-ALIGN: center"><a onblur="try {parent.deselectBloggerImageGracefully();} catch(e) {}" href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgLgfhSNLh6Fw_jUU4vVQ52ZySU-T4Achl8ETgS95px-PmXwO67qXH33ecCHckhSXeRpkW7NBWtcLw0wdy11A9NlMbOK2sxr7vuKHPqqhoU8ezyksFQHpty4H7_ZzawsuMsz66l9x7vivcQ/s1600-h/compare.jpg"><img id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5175935589121055698" style="DISPLAY: block; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; CURSOR: pointer; TEXT-ALIGN: center" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgLgfhSNLh6Fw_jUU4vVQ52ZySU-T4Achl8ETgS95px-PmXwO67qXH33ecCHckhSXeRpkW7NBWtcLw0wdy11A9NlMbOK2sxr7vuKHPqqhoU8ezyksFQHpty4H7_ZzawsuMsz66l9x7vivcQ/s320/compare.jpg" border="0" /></a><span style="font-size:78%;">The total collapse of most of the LTTE controlled territory in the past few years has allowed Sri Lanka the opportunity to end this long war once and for all.<br /><br /></span></div><span style="font-size:78%;"></span>However, Sri Lankan Military advances have stalled on all fronts in the Wanni. While minor advances continue on the Mannar, Weli Oya, Vavuniya, and Jaffna fronts, these advances are measured in yards. Initially, general Fonseka did not want to capture territory. His objective was to kill as many LTTE fighters as possible to degrade their military force ahead of a major offensive in the months between rainy seasons. With over a month of good weather already lost since the Northern Offensive began, there has been a disappointing lack of progress into LTTE territory. This can be attributed to four key factors:<br /><br /><ul><li>The No-man's Land between Sri Lankan and LTTE trenches have been heavily mined, as have areas within LTTE defenses.</li><li>Public Opinion holds back a major offensive because many people fear the heavier upfront casualties that such an offensive would entail.<br /></li><li>General Fonseka is acting too conservatively for various military reasons.<br /></li><li>Economic considerations limit Sri Lanka's capacity to wage war.</li></ul><br />In this first of another two part series, the question of clearing the minefields that are largely responsible for the stalled Sri Lankan advance will be addressed<br /><br />The large number of anti-personnel mines and a fewer number of anti-tank mines are a serious threat that impedes Sri Lankan advances. Several solutions exist to combat the minefields, each with different strengths and weaknesses. Defining and implementing a strategy to break through these minefields and any future minefields with relative speed and effectiveness should be one of the highest priorities of the military, if not the highest. Four main possible solutions, each with with unique benefits and drawbacks, will be discussed here.<br /><br /><br /><div style="TEXT-ALIGN: center"><a onblur="try {parent.deselectBloggerImageGracefully();} catch(e) {}" href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEi1vawOJK4wcm1hkEGL6Fm1cftM9KCj5v00ccCjuOASbwFuWe03DB6puY3mVBLTqnhyphenhyphenzUK58rQaA5LUYulhtUZKyfQxvG294Mo7y6L7geAzeOWcZuSe0u144N3Yjus_Y6zJASJqJWBz9-5u/s1600-h/poke+and+pray.jpg"><img id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5175872332842720130" style="DISPLAY: block; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; CURSOR: pointer; TEXT-ALIGN: center" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEi1vawOJK4wcm1hkEGL6Fm1cftM9KCj5v00ccCjuOASbwFuWe03DB6puY3mVBLTqnhyphenhyphenzUK58rQaA5LUYulhtUZKyfQxvG294Mo7y6L7geAzeOWcZuSe0u144N3Yjus_Y6zJASJqJWBz9-5u/s320/poke+and+pray.jpg" border="0" /></a><span style="font-size:78%;">The Sri Lankan military has used this low-tech method of eliminating mines for decades.<br /><br /></span></div>The first option is the oldest solution to land mines in existence. Often referred to as the "Poke and Pray" method, this is the simple act of having an individual walk into an area thought to be mined and start poking the ground with a knife or stick. When they hit something metallic or hollow, they carefully dig it up and dispose of it, all the while praying that the mine doesn't explode in their face. This method is very slow and would take too long to be a viable option for clearing a path into the Wanni. The use of hand held metal detectors is a derivative of this method.<br /><br /><div style="TEXT-ALIGN: center"><a onblur="try {parent.deselectBloggerImageGracefully();} catch(e) {}" href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhZ0q2BI5ynO0VUtbSQcpzdvVI8v6EhqS2lBLkk_pM0HDjl9D5r8EtWP-Kqh5_qqEkuOW4mGbh1YdcTpxjTxzP8yo1EvDd6aX5Gf1NcF5i6tUVJvq73EbwNURSxvtgKSXM4d-ADIFNBlKBq/s1600-h/flail.jpg"><img id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5175875618492701602" style="DISPLAY: block; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; CURSOR: pointer; TEXT-ALIGN: center" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhZ0q2BI5ynO0VUtbSQcpzdvVI8v6EhqS2lBLkk_pM0HDjl9D5r8EtWP-Kqh5_qqEkuOW4mGbh1YdcTpxjTxzP8yo1EvDd6aX5Gf1NcF5i6tUVJvq73EbwNURSxvtgKSXM4d-ADIFNBlKBq/s320/flail.jpg" border="0" /></a><span style="font-size:78%;">A flail system was the first effective method of quickly clearing a safe path through a minefield.<br /><br /></span></div>A second option is to used a modified bulldozer equipped with swinging chain flails in place of the standard blade to "rake" the minefield. This method is much faster than the previous solution and workers are protected from the dangers of anti-personnel mines. It does suffer from two big setbacks though.<br /><br />Terrain can greatly limit where a bulldozer can go. The thick jungles of the Wanni and any rocky terrain can limit the bulldozer's effectiveness and even prevent access all together. This allows the LTTE to know well in advance where this system can punch a hole for a military advance, and they have had a long time to prepare strong defenses in these bottlenecks. An ideal solution would allow the military to break through the minefield at a greater number of locations, preventing the LTTE from catching soldiers in a vulnerable bottleneck. The whole of the Jaffna Front is testament to this problem.<br /><br />The other issue is the bulldozer's vulnerability to enemy fire. These slow lumbering targets are easy to hit with RPGs, mortars, rockets, and even artillery. While escorts can and must be assigned to each bulldozer, by the nature of their task, they must be exposed to enemy fire more than any other unit. This gives bulldozer units a high casualty probability and these prospects make this an undesirable solution, though they will probably be used anyway, where possible, due to necessity.<br /><br />A third option that has been considered in the past but has proven to not be very reliable is the bombardment solution. The general idea is to saturate a minefield with artillery, mortar, rocket, and even cluster bomb air strikes to blast a hole through the mines. Despite it being the safest, since no one has to actually enter the minefield or brave hostile fire, four issues make this solution a dead end.<br /><br />First, the imperfect nature of carpet bombing means that there is no way to be sure that a path is clear. Next, unexploded munitions add risk to soldiers on the march, replacing many of the mines that would have been destroyed. The last purely military problem is that the hours or days of bombardment would be a pretty obvious giveaway that the SLA plans to move through this particular chunk of real estate. This gives the LTTE plenty of time to prepare for Sri Lankan advances. On an economic note, the price for the munitions needed for such an attempt would be beyond Sri Lanka's economic capacity, assuming they plan to fight the rest of the war after breaking through. Given that their ability to pay for the Northern offensive is already in doubt, this kind of spending is a get out of jail free card for the Tigers.<br /><br /><br /><div style="TEXT-ALIGN: center"><a onblur="try {parent.deselectBloggerImageGracefully();} catch(e) {}" href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgOeP5YVNLOvQLM6rbtPaRn4w0GM4VH7fNM0Neuc1K0x-BjwwuG9h4MxbMzTjM4evqLbrb-MSZDFGk-AcaxJ8p-6mtOgUfZeuRH8j1h8tGJv7jmW5CIR1xVgkuIWh813NGQmUJOnPIGmgVV/s1600-h/bomb+on+a+rope.jpg"><img id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5175897342437284786" style="DISPLAY: block; MARGIN: 0px auto 10px; CURSOR: pointer; TEXT-ALIGN: center" alt="" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgOeP5YVNLOvQLM6rbtPaRn4w0GM4VH7fNM0Neuc1K0x-BjwwuG9h4MxbMzTjM4evqLbrb-MSZDFGk-AcaxJ8p-6mtOgUfZeuRH8j1h8tGJv7jmW5CIR1xVgkuIWh813NGQmUJOnPIGmgVV/s320/bomb+on+a+rope.jpg" border="0" /></a><span style="font-size:78%;">Using a chain of explosives to clear a path through a minefield has proven to be very effective in recent conflicts, including the Gulf War and Operation Iraqi Freedom.<br /><br /></span></div><span style="font-size:78%;"></span>Another solution that has possibly the greatest potential for success is the use of explosive chains fired into a minefield to blast a hole path for soldiers to exploit. This method is used by most well to do military organizations, such as the Chinese and the NATO states. Gaps varying in size from enough for a single file line of infantry to wide gaps for tank columns can be made depending on the power of the explosives and can clear a path hundreds of yards long. These explosives use shock waves to detonate the mines as if they had been stepped on, and as a result of using shock waves that pass through the air and ground, the trees and stones that might limit a bulldozer are no longer sufficient protection for the mines. By firing a chain of explosives from a certain distance, the mine clearing units are more protected from enemy fire than a bulldozer would be, while the unit is never at risk from the mines they are seeking to clear. The effectiveness and superior safety of this design make this the preferable solution on a purely military level. The only serious drawback is the cost, not only in building the contraptions but in munitions that bulldozers don't spend. Looking at cost in this way, though, is not the right way to go about assessing value. These costs must be compared, not just to the cost of modifying a bulldozer, but also to the price of replacing destroyed bulldozers and the cost in lives that more dangerous methods entail, as well as the cost in tactical military capabilities, since a bulldozer is limited in where it can advance, giving the LTTE clear indications of SLA routes of advance.<br /><br />The basic conclusion is that bulldozers should be used in cleared areas where mines remain, and in areas where explosive chain units are not available, but that these explosive chains should be used as extensively as possible on the front lines.<br /><br />Now an odd reaction seen from many Sri Lankans when it comes to military hardware is "who can we buy these from" and this is another example of this. It then opens up the debate on how Sri Lanka can afford to buy such units and this has become the killing stroke for many ideas for military reforms. This is a bizarre reaction. This is a dangerous mindset that should be discouraged. The LTTE are masters of innovation and the Sri Lankan military should seek to emulate them in this regard. Explosive chains are just packages of explosive material, chained together, thus the name. The rest of this engineering marvel is building an industrial grade blowgun with "bomb on a rope" tied to the end. If the blowgun method proves to be too problematic, the SLA could always just remove the warhead from a mid-range rocket from one of the MBRLs and use it. They might even use the MBRL itself and not even have to build a separate unit for mine clearing. Regardless, this is not science only attainable by world superpowers.<br /><br />This is just one example of Sri Lanka's bad habit of seeking to buy what they can make, but that's a story for another time.E.T. Baileyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14369204396507186919noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6349712234964693405.post-80438869007485917322008-03-08T22:38:00.000-08:002008-03-09T13:56:52.443-07:00The Darfur Conflict, Part Two: The Plan for Military Action in DarfurFew people seem to realize what would be required for any peacekeeping operation in Darfur to be successful. Clearly the small peacekeeping missions of the African Union and the United Nations have never seen success in Africa. From Somalia, to the Democratic Republic of Congo, to Darfur, to Rwanda, small efforts yield even smaller results. If the genocide is to truly be stopped, and if the war is truly to be ended, then a military force will be needed on the scale of World War Two's Russian Front.<br /><br />A large military force entering the region to stop all warring parties from fighting their enemies will result in all of these armed groups seeing the peacekeeping force as an invading army sticking its nose where it doesn’t belong. This large number of hostile combatants will require a huge military force to overcome, while the campaign, especially if Western nations are involved, will probably result in foreign terrorist groups entering the country, further increasing the number of hostile fighters arrayed against it. To really understand what this entails, two factors must be understood: the size of the conflict zone and the different groups that will be enemies of the Darfur Peacekeeping Force, or DPKF.<br /><br /><br /><div style="text-align: center;"><a onblur="try {parent.deselectBloggerImageGracefully();} catch(e) {}" href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEh6f-6xNFy08Ghbk8fdtmuMjhkiO16RHWRTPbeiJYHYwzK5r31FbnAXdlUYvpc0Ps2pNfxy1pM9FG_WG9NNtLhOC1umEtSC51Cfw7H4aNseTjHT7pgAkGzWPkp9pVxTAvPqN8wALgqOr4cL/s1600-h/darfur_chad_car_2_416.gif"><img style="margin: 0px auto 10px; display: block; text-align: center; cursor: pointer;" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEh6f-6xNFy08Ghbk8fdtmuMjhkiO16RHWRTPbeiJYHYwzK5r31FbnAXdlUYvpc0Ps2pNfxy1pM9FG_WG9NNtLhOC1umEtSC51Cfw7H4aNseTjHT7pgAkGzWPkp9pVxTAvPqN8wALgqOr4cL/s320/darfur_chad_car_2_416.gif" alt="" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5175844518634511186" border="0" /></a> <span style="font-size:78%;">As you can see, the conflict has spread to three separate nations.</span> <span style="font-size:78%;">(Courtesy of the BBC)</span><br /></div><span style="font-size:78%;"><span style="font-size:100%;"><br /></span></span><a onblur="try {parent.deselectBloggerImageGracefully();} catch(e) {}" href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEh6f-6xNFy08Ghbk8fdtmuMjhkiO16RHWRTPbeiJYHYwzK5r31FbnAXdlUYvpc0Ps2pNfxy1pM9FG_WG9NNtLhOC1umEtSC51Cfw7H4aNseTjHT7pgAkGzWPkp9pVxTAvPqN8wALgqOr4cL/s1600-h/darfur_chad_car_2_416.gif"><span style="font-size:78%;"></span></a>Darfur is a region that borders, or is arguably a part of, four different countries, of which at least three have seen significant violence. Assuming Libya has kept and can continue to keep the peace on the small border it has with Darfur, the nations of Sudan, Chad, and the Central African Republic all contain part of a very large and continually expanding combat zone. Since any massive military operation by foreign powers within their borders would be seen by all three nations as acts of war, if the DPKF were to be created and deployed, they would be campaigning in the entire area of all three countries. This is because they would have to not only neutralize a plethora of militant and terrorist groups, but would also have to bring the governments and military forces of all three nations to heel. This assumes that no belligerent forces base themselves from within additional nations like Uganda or Ethiopia, which is a very real possibility. Under this assumption, the minimum size of the area the DPKF would be keeping the peace in would be roughly half the size of the entire United States.<br /><br />To give an idea of the force needed to take control of such a large area, the Iraq War proves to be an easy example. Iraq is roughly the size of California. 160,000 American military personnel, roughly 400,000 Iraqi soldiers and police, 70,000 Sons of Iraq, and somewhere in the range of 10,000 troops from various other nations have been required, not to totally defeat the insurgency, but to reduce it to the point where progress can be made in the country. Taking into account the temporary nature of the American escalation and the growing strength of the Sons of Iraq movement, between 600,000 and 650,000 men under arms have been required just to allow the opportunity for progress. To boot, much of this success relies on the good will of currently dormant militias that have combined numbers in the tens of thousands.<br /><br /><div style="text-align: center;"><a onblur="try {parent.deselectBloggerImageGracefully();} catch(e) {}" href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEinexU0gAg_UcK0qH5t7Co0_3sTQ9RheDarwZb6DFQaCDS-QdAV2JtzeawnWFZ-71-6QAmpz-907WmhjTw8Zi_TWfoPrhJT2DjJ8FvJvReZcQh1Q2wF9MH8kKXZz9xW9dWfkVRc52syXVWD/s1600-h/Large+map.jpg"><img style="margin: 0px auto 10px; display: block; text-align: center; cursor: pointer;" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEinexU0gAg_UcK0qH5t7Co0_3sTQ9RheDarwZb6DFQaCDS-QdAV2JtzeawnWFZ-71-6QAmpz-907WmhjTw8Zi_TWfoPrhJT2DjJ8FvJvReZcQh1Q2wF9MH8kKXZz9xW9dWfkVRc52syXVWD/s400/Large+map.jpg" alt="" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5175845600966269794" border="0" /></a><span style="font-size:78%;"> Notice the difference in size between Iraq and the combined nations of Sudan, Chad, and the Central African Republic</span><br /></div><span style="font-size:78%;"><span style="font-size:100%;"><br /></span></span>The minimum area that must be controlled by the DPKF is over 10 times Iraq's size. Assuming that the combined military force of all three nations and all militant groups, plus foreign terrorist groups that will surely arrive to counter Western influence, will prove to be only as dangerous as the militant groups currently active in Iraq, and assuming that the current situation in Iraq is the desired first phase of the future for Darfur, 6-6.5 million troops will be required for the DPKF, along with a Naval force in the Red Sea that will consist of at lead two American Carrier Groups. A force of this size will by no means totally secure the region, but it is the required size for achieving relative control over most of the territory. Anything less than this will make it impossible to adequately protect all major population centers and resources, will leave a porous and unprotected border, and will allow belligerents the luxury of safe havens where there are no available troops to patrol.<br /><br />A military force of this size is an impossible undertaking. It would require a total commitment by every major world power, the whole of NATO, and the African Union to have anywhere close to that number of soldiers just on paper. Without a doubt, America, and any other committed nation that does not currently have a military draft, will require one. The logistical demands for such a force would be so great that it would be beyond the capabilities of any alliance. Even if reality were to temporarily step aside and allow such a force to be assembled and supplied, the costs of keeping so large a force in the field would mean that all nations involved would face bankruptcy in a matter of months.<br /><br />Since this minimum size for the guarantee of a minimum level of success is beyond the capabilities of the whole of humanity, and certainly beyond the willpower of the American public, any peacekeeping mission must accept that they cannot stop the violence or end the genocide. The best that can be hoped for is that a much smaller DPKF can create a safe haven for refugees. It would be like Srebrenica during the Balkans Conflict, but it would be much larger. Such a fortified safe haven would be totally dependent on a permanent military force. Should the contributing nations ever require their soldiers for the benefit of their own nations the mass of refugees would be totally vulnerable to attack from those who forced them to seek shelter in the first place. When this happened in the Balkans, 8,000 people were killed the moment peace keepers withdrew. On the scale that would probably exist in Darfur, tens, maybe even hundreds of thousands could die. Not only would the refugees be totally and permanently dependent on the DPKF for their survival, but they would be forced into a small area of land by strategic need for a totally secure perimeter. This prevents the population from establishing agriculture or industry, ensuring their perpetual dependency on foreign food aid, medical aid, and basic tools for living, as well as all other nonrenewable resources, such as fuel for cooking fires and potable water.<br /><br />Since the fact remains that a military intervention will be seen as an act of war by whatever nation has been invaded, either a deal must be brokered, which is unlikely, or a military campaign will have to be waged to destroy that nations capacity to endanger safe zones. This could destabilize that government and may result in the total collapse of centralized government, since nations like Chad are barely holding on the a central government as it is. If central governments collapse, the result would likely be a mirror image of Somalia, where feudal warlords and Islamic clerics, turned politicians, fight for resources and territory, while the people starve and are caught in the cross-fire.<br /><br />Ignoring this all too likely result of even a moderate sized intervention. this total and unending dependency on the DPKF for protection, and foreign aid for all other aspects of living make this solution as bad or worse than doing nothing at all. It forces refugees to rely on the outside world for every aspect of their existence and forces them into unproductive lives. By not getting involved, the world powers may be ignoring a genocide, but they do give the victims of this conflict the gift of self dependency. Where an intervention would be impossible on a large scale, and would create a parasitic society on a smaller scale, nonintervention would force those being brutalized to develop solutions for themselves. Instead of relying on a perpetual military presence from other world powers, they will be forced to learn to defend themselves.<br /><br />Instead of living on a reservation where minimal to no food can be grown, and where negligible quantities of other goods can be produced, they will be free to defend however much land they have the capacity to hold, where food can be grown. As bad a feeling as it may give many people, a more lasting solution may be found by embracing this conflict. Populations under threat from militias or oppressive governments should be given military aid, and basic instructions on how to use the weapons they have. Just as they must be taught to fish instead of being fed by others forever, they must learn to protect themselves, not rely on the protection of foreign military forces. Once those facing genocide are able to defend their land and assets, and kill those who have sought their annihilation, the violence will lessen.E.T. Baileyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14369204396507186919noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-6349712234964693405.post-72293091280038391522008-03-08T21:58:00.000-08:002008-03-08T22:59:19.572-08:00The Darfur Conflict, Part One: Humanitarian Aid and the Army Corps of EngineersOn campuses across America, student activists are calling for American intervention in Darfur. The genocide occurring there has become one of the latest political fads. “Save Darfur” shirts and information booths are a common sight, but finding someone who actually understands the depths of the conflict there is a harder task. Even finding someone who knows exactly what they mean when they call for action by the American government is difficult. Some want economic trade embargoes to be put on Sudan, while others want all nations involved to be part of a collective embargo. Some want America to send an unprecedented aid package in humanitarian aid, and still many more just want America to do “something.” What that something is, is anyone’s guess.<br /><br />Some even want a NATO military force to be sent to Darfur to try and end the violence. What this really means, whether they realize it or not, is that they want an American military intervention, since the military might of all other NATO member nations combined would not have the manpower to even begin to take on this task with only a proportional American force along side them. An American military intervention or a mass aid package are both idealistic solutions and are nonviable options in the real world. In this first of a two part Article on Darfur, a non-military solution will be shown as impossible to achieve and harmful to even attempt.<br /><br />Sending millions of tons of flour, rice, and other food supplies into famine struck regions of Africa has been a favored method of dealing with the problems gripping the continent for decades, while the amount of money spent on aid to third world countries has been a quick way to boost a donating nation’s status with the world. A simple look at the countries that receive this aid seems to indicate that this system does not work. At best it is a tremendous effort for short-term benefit and no long-term solution. At worst, it exacerbates the problems that any aid package hopes to solve.<br /><br />This is just a large-scale version of the old saying, “if you give a man a fish he’ll eat for a day, but if you teach a man to fish he’ll eat for a lifetime.” Sending massive food shipments to parts of Africa that are facing famine, generally, is never enough to even prevent all starvation deaths, but even worse is the dependency it causes. As a result of food, literally, falling from the sky, many farmers stop trying to cultivate the land. What’s the use if the crops often fail and America and Europe will feed the population better than farming ever could? So now the food aid can’t ever really end the famines, gives an incentive to farmers to stop working, which prolongs and worsens the famines, and the result is that this food aid promotes over population in areas that, clearly, cannot support the number of people currently residing there.<br /><br />Aid must be coupled with the building of infrastructure so that the population can feed itself. Agricultural infrastructure is vitally important to the survival of any region’s population. Irrigation, larger canals, the capacity to produce fertilizer and the safest possible pesticides locally, and agriculture tools and equipment are all needed, as are crops that can produce best in whatever region is being modernized. Desertification is also a threat that needs to be countered in many regions with hearty plant growth that is permanent, and not part of a food crop that is dug up and replanted every year. Innovative methods of increasing food production and food diversity are needed to not only feed a greater portion of the population, but also help build up people's immune systems. Crop cycles should be established that replenish the nutrients in the soil will help prevent future crop failures, while canals and livestock watering ponds can have hearty fish species introduced. Livestock should be bred to improve the survivability and the nutritional value of animals. All of this means that when a region is facing famine, they need the Army Corps of Engineers just as badly, or more so, than they need protein powder dropped from a cargo plane.<br /><br />Unfortunately for Darfur, the Army Corps of Engineers wouldn’t be on the job long before certain groups of people started shooting at them. For any infrastructure building projects to occur, a certain level of security must be won first. Since food aid won’t solve the problem and will probably be stolen by anyone with a gun to be sold for more weapons, and since Darfur is a war zone that is far too active for the massive building projects that would be required to give this region any hope of future prosperity to occur, only two options seem to remain. America and the outside world can do nothing and let the natives fight each other, as they have for decades, until one side finally wins and the genocide is taken to its bloody conclusion, or a massive foreign military force can be sent into Africa to engage and destroy all of the many combatants, or at least force them to accept a cease-fire. This is an impossible undertaking that America could never hope to achieve, even if Iraq had never been invaded. This military option will be the subject of the second article.E.T. Baileyhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14369204396507186919noreply@blogger.com1